Energy poverty has been a growing reality in Spain since the start of the economic crisis in 2008. As a consequence of growing unemployment figures and energy prices, the number of households with excessive spending on domestic energy, a lack of thermal comfort in the dwelling and that have fallen behind on bill payments has grown significantly since 2007. In addition, a higher incidence of energy poverty has been confirmed in certain socioeconomic groups, such as single-parent families, the unemployed, pensioners, families with young children and families with a low level of education, among others. To tackle this situation, at the Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales (Environmental Sciences Association – ACA) we consider it necessary to promote a state-wide strategy with the involvement of all agents that favours palliative measures to support more vulnerable households effectively in the short term as well as structural solutions, such  as the energy rehabilitation of the country’s housing stock.

Although the symbolic crash of United States investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 is an increasingly distant memory, the effects of the economic crisis are still evident across broad layers of Spanish society. Despite positive rates of economic growth and the fall in unemployment figures registered since the end of 2013, the perception exists that there continues to be a persistent loss of purchasing power, wellbeing and social rights. This perception can be quantified, for example, in the fact that, since the start of the crisis, growing numbers of citizens have found themselves incapable of paying their household energy bills, which has led to a growing situation of energy poverty in Spain.

Published since 2012, the reports from the ACA describe energy poverty as a situation in which a household “is incapable of paying for an amount of energy sufficient to satisfy its domestic needs and/or when it is forced to assign an excessive part of its income to paying its own energy bill” (Tirado Herrero et al., 2012; 2014; 2016). This definition, like many other proposals from academic and institutional spheres of the EU, places emphasis on capacity to pay as the central idea of the energy poverty concept. This contrasts with others that focus on the lack of access to energy vectors of quality, such as the electricity or natural gas supply, a situation that occurs in broad areas of the countries in the global south.

The notion of energy poverty is associated commonly with the use of energy for heating, although it should be taken into account that the satisfaction of other domestic needs (provision of hot water and lighting, services provided by electrical appliances, cooking of food, etc.) is also an integral part of the definition. However normally not considered are transport costs (largely costs associated with fuel consumption), nor payments related with domestic water consumption. In other words, the concept is centred fundamentally around the energy services that are consumed in the space of the dwelling. This is, therefore, an eminently domestic phenomenon and one defined on a household scale.

More recent  descriptions of this condition define energy vulnerability as the probability that a household is in a situation in which it does not have an adequate quantity of energy services (Bouzarovski and Petrova, 2015). This new concept allows for more dynamic comprehension of the phenomenon according to which households suffer from energy poverty at specific times as a consequence of internal changes in the family unit (loss of employment, birth/death of a family member, presence of a chronically ill person, etc.) or due to external changes (economic crisis, change in criteria for assignment of social tariffs, increase in prices of energy on a national or global scale, etc.). In this way, the focus is placed on the structural and contextual conditions that go beyond the triad of factors traditionally considered in the classical definitions of energy poverty (household income, prices of energy and household energy efficiency).

All the indicators analysed over the course of recent years show that energy poverty is a problem that, far from having being solved, continues to affect millions of people living in Spain.

The most recent report by the ACA has been produced based on microdata from the surveys on Family Budgets (EPF) and Living Conditions (ECV) by Spain’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) corresponding to the year 2014 (the latest with microdata available at the date this document is produced). According to the results of this report, 11% of Spanish households (equivalent to 5.1 million people) stated they were unable to maintain their home at an adequate temperature during the coldest months. Furthermore, 8% of households (4.2 million people) stated they had fallen behind on paying for their household bills, including domestic energy bills; and 15% (6.2 million people) stated they had to allocate more than 10% of their annual income to paying for energy for their dwelling.

If the United Kingdom’s official energy poverty rating is applied to the Spanish case, then 10% of households (4.9 million people) are experiencing difficulties. This means that, once housing and domestic energy costs have been paid, their income lies below the monetary poverty line and that simultaneously their spending on domestic energy is above the average per equivalised person for the whole of Spain. Moreover, the percentage of people in difficulty rises to account for 21% of households (12.1 million people) if the Minimum Income Standard indicator is applied to Spain. In line with this methodology, and again after discounting energy and household running costs, the incomes of these households stand below the highest Guaranteed Minimum Income in Spain (that of the Basque Country).

In addition, in 2012 nearly 25% of households stated they were incapable of maintaining their home at a sufficiently cool temperature in summer, according to microdata from the ECV. This is an aspect of thermal comfort that has not received sufficient attention to date, despite it being especially relevant for large areas of Spain and of other countries in Southern Europe.

Despite improvements in the key macroeconomic factors (economic growth, unemployment and occupation) in the years 2013 and 2014, the evolution over time of the two most significant indicators relating to energy poverty (adequate temperature in winter and falling behind on payments of bills) maintain their upwards trend in a sustained manner until 2014 (Graph 1). Especially significant is the fact that in 2014, the recorded percentage of people incapable of maintaining an adequate temperature in winter was higher than the EU average. The figure was also higher than in countries in the centre and north of Europe such as Germany and Sweden, with cooler climates.

For their part, the indicators based on expenditure and income show an increase in the energy expenditure per household in parallel with a reduction in nominal income. Thus, whereas in 2008 an average household had an income of 20,500 euros, in 2014 this figure had fallen to 19,200 euros. That same average household increased its energy bill from 611 euros in 2006 to 960 euros in 2012, although from 2012 to 2014, the average domestic energy bill in Spain fell to 882 euros per year (see Graph 2). Given that this downwards tendency cannot be explained by a decrease in energy prices, the data could be indicating that, far from being an improvement in the situation, vulnerable households are finding it increasingly difficult to pay for their domestic energy needs and that their energy consumption has decreased.

Analysis of the data from the INE’s EPF survey has also allowed an upwards tendency to be detected in levels of energy inequality. Initially proposed to analyse differences in levels of access to energy on a global scale, this concept has made evident the substantial differences in energy consumption per person between different parts of the world. According to estimates from the International Institute for Applied System Analysis (IIASA), energy consumption per capita in OECD countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia and many EU members is two or three times that of countries in the south. Thus, it is estimated that the richest third of the population is consuming two thirds of all the energy produced in the world (Pachauri and Rao, 2014).

In the case of Spain, the concept of energy inequality has been used to explore the differences between households with different purchasing power in key variables. Thus, as can be seen in Graph 3, in 2014 spending on domestic energy of an average household belonging to the 10% of the highest-income households in Spain was 9 euros per square metre and person, an expenditure figure that represents 3% of their annual income. In contrast, in the same year an average household of the 10% of poorest households spent 6 euros per square metre and person, some 12% of their annual income. Thus, the homes with the lowest incomes spend a third less on energy than those with the greatest purchasing power, but also have to make an effort four times greater (in proportion to their annual income) to be able to pay their domestic energy bills. These disparities grew more pronounced between 2007 and 2014, as shown by Graph 3. Here we see a tendency similar to indicators of income inequality: in accordance with data from the World Bank, the Gini index in Spain grew from 33.9 to 35.9 between 2007 and 2012.

The studies carried out by ACA since 2012 show a broad diversity of values for different energy poverty indicators in each autonomous community. These disparities in the figures obtained suggest that different measuring methods capture different types of households, and even different types of vulnerabilities.

In the latest energy poverty report published by ACA in 2016, it is observed that despite the territorial complexity of the data, there are four regions that are more greatly affected in both 2007 and 2014, and three autonomous communities that are affected to a lesser degree. These results suggest that climate conditions are not determining factors for explaining the regional differences in energy poverty rates. Furthermore, results broken down by population density of the place of residence indicate a higher proportion of homes affected in rural or semi-urban areas.

For its part, analysis of household socio-demographic conditions proposes the existence of certain vulnerability factors. The comparison conducted in the aforementioned report reveals a higher incidence of energy poverty as much in households where the reference person has a low level of education, is single, widowed or divorced, or originates from a country outside of the EU, as in households with single-parent families.

Employment status is also shown as a vulnerability factor. Households suffering joblessness and depending on unemployment subsidies or other benefits have a greater probability of suffering energy poverty according to EPF and ECV indicators. In households with employment, there is also a higher rate of energy poverty when temporary or fixed term contracts are present in comparison with permanent job contracts (Table 1).

The effects of energy poverty on health have been studied and documented widely for several decades. It is related with a higher prevalence of certain diseases that affect vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and children, more intensely. Specifically, it has been associated with breathing problems, difficulties gaining weight in children, greater incidence of mental health problems in adolescents, greater prevalence of influenza and colds, worse physical conditions in individuals with arthritis and rheumatism and worsening of the diet due to restrictions imposed by energy bills in the household budget (Marmot Review Team, 2011).

However, the best known and most debated impact of energy poverty is the increase in the risk of premature death among elderly people. It is known that living in a dwelling with temperatures below recommended levels (between 18°C and 20°C according to the World Health Organisation) is related with an increase in mortality associated with respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. This is what is known as excess winter mortality. Although only a fraction of excess deaths occurring in the cold season are strictly attributable to energy poverty, their correlation with energy efficiency of residential buildings and dwelling temperatures is sufficiently well established (The Eurowinter Group, 1997). For example, data on the mortality and interior temperature of homes in the United Kingdome indicate that the excess winter mortality registered in 25% of the coldest households is three times greater than that registered in the 25% of dwellings with better thermal comfort (Marmot Review Team, 2011).

In accordance with mortality data from the INE, it is calculated that every year in Spain around 24,000 more people die in the cold months (from November to March) than in the rest of the year. This figure is what is known as the absolute excess winter mortality rate (EWMR), and only a fraction of this rate is strictly attributable to energy poverty. Specifically, initial estimates with data for Europe from the WHO (Braubach et al., 2011) indicate that energy poverty could be causing some 7,100 premature deaths per year in Spain (some 30% of the absolute EWMR), with a possible range of uncertainty of between 2,400 and 9,500 deaths per year (corresponding to between 10% and 40% of the absolute EWMR). In comparison, some 4,000 people died per year in traffic accidents on average in the period 1996-2014; moreover, it is estimated that atmospheric contamination causes close to 33,000 early deaths per year in Spain.

In light of the facts presented in this article, the Environmental Sciences Association (ACA) believes it is necessary to promote a state-wide strategy to fight energy poverty and proposes coordinated action between the different actors and levels of the administration. The aforementioned strategy should be proposed as a tool for intervention and as a process for reaching agreement between actors with contrasting interests and views.

The state-wide strategy to combat energy poverty should consider three priority questions, the first of which would consist of recognising the energy rehabilitation of buildings as a preventive measure for reducing the present and future vulnerability of the population. The reform of policies for financing energy efficiency is urgent, with the aim of benefiting primarily vulnerable households that have difficulties in investing in their dwellings. Similarly, analysis is recommended of the possibilities offered by renewable technologies, especially photovoltaic solar energy under a self-supply system, to reduce the dependency and the bills of vulnerable consumers.

The second priority question consists of adequately defining what is meant by vulnerable consumer in energy terms, a question that at present is associated with possible beneficiaries of the social electricity tariff. A review needs to be tackled of the criteria for assigning this measure, almost the only one that exists at present to reduce household energy bills.

Finally, imperative action is needed in the field of cuts in supply due to inability to pay the bills. For this it is recommended that a new legislative framework be established based on the experiences that exist (such as Law 24/2015 of Catalonia) that guarantee that no vulnerable household is left without an energy supply to the home, above all given the serious consequences that this has for people’s health, social integration and quality of life.

Sergio Tirado Herrero
RMIT University Europe / Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales (Environmental Sciences Association – ACA)

José Luis López Fernández
Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales (Environmental Sciences Association – ACA)

Luis Jiménez Meneses
Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales (Environmental Sciences Association – ACA)

Bouzarovski, S., and S. Petrova (2015): “A global perspective on domestic energy deprivation: overcoming the energy poverty-fuel poverty binary”, Energy Research and Social Science, 10.

Braubach, M., D.E. Jacobs and D. Ormandy (eds.) (2011): Environmental burden of disease associated with inadequate housing. A method guide to the quantification of health effects of selected housing risks in the WHO European Region, Copenhagen: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe.

Lawrence, S., Q. Liu and V. Yakovlenko (2013): «Global inequality in energy consumption from 1980 to 2010», Entropy, 15.

Marmot Review Team (2011): The health impacts of cold homes and fuel poverty, London: Friends of the Earth & the Marmot Review Team.

Pachauri, S., and N. Rao (2014): Energy inequality, Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) [http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/alg/energy-inequality.html].

The Eurowinter Group (1997): «Cold exposure and winter mortality from ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease, respiratory disease, and all causes in warm and cold regions of Europe», The Lancet, 349(9062).

Tirado-Herrero, S., L. Jiménez-Meneses, J.L. López-Fernández, J. Martín-García and E. Perero-Van-Hove (2014): Pobreza energética en España. Análisis de tendencias, Madrid: Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales.

Tirado Herrero, S., L. Jiménez Meneses, J.L. López Fernández, E. Perero Van Hove, V.M. Irigoyen Hidalgo and P. Savary (2016): Pobreza, vulnerabilidad y desigualdad energética. Nuevos enfoques de análisis, Madrid: Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales.

Tirado Herrero, S., J.L. López Fernández and P. Martín García (2012): Pobreza energética en España. Potencial de generación de empleo directo de la pobreza derivado de la rehabilitación energética de viviendas, Madrid: Asociación de Ciencias Ambientales.

Statistical data from the European Union on income and living conditions (EU-SILC) show that, in two very di?erent economic contexts (2012, at the height of crisis, and 2016, in the recovery phase), concentrating transfers specifically on targeting children is more e?ective than channelling them towards the entire population based on income.

Reducing child poverty constitutes one of the major challenges facing societies that aim to achieve greater levels of integration, cohesion and present and future economic effciency. Shortages suffered in childhood have consequences that go beyond this life stage: children who grow up in poor households show worse academic outcomes and, subsequently, lower income levels and worse health than children who grow up in households that do not suffer financial hardships. Ultimately, child poverty means that inequality is maintained and it turns out to be economically ineffcient for the whole of society.

It is considered that children are at risk of poverty when they live in a household whose income, once social transfers have been taken into account, is below 60% of the country’s median income. Using this criterion, in the year 2017, some 28.3% of children in Spain and 20.7% of those in Portugal were at risk of poverty (Eurostat, 2017). For Spain this figure represents an increase of one percentage point with respect to the year 2008, prior to the economic crisis. In contrast, in Portugal the risk of child poverty has fallen by over two points with respect to that registered in 2008 (figure 1).

Although the evolution of the poverty risk since 2008 has been similar in both countries, with a peak in 2014 followed by a gradual reduction until 2017, in the case of Spain the growth in child poverty during the crisis was more pronounced and its subsequent reduction is proving to be lower.

The risk of child poverty has been linked to unemployment levels, as children predominantly live in households where income is obtained from working. However, it is notable that, despite the improvement in employment as a consequence of the economic recovery, the risk of child poverty remains higher than the levels prior to the crisis. This fact suggests that, to understand the phenomenon of child poverty, rather than the unemployment rate in itself, we must take into account other aspects of the labour market such as the number of hours worked or the average salary.

In any event, one of the main ways that countries have to alleviate situations of poverty in general and child poverty in particular are social transfers.

To understand the impact of social transfers on child poverty it is important to take into account both the total expenditure and the distribution of spending by type (whether its destination is children, retirement, unemployment, survival, social exclusion, etc.) and whether it is more or less conditioned to the income level of receivers. 

In Spain, total spending on cash transfers (unemployment, retirement, survival, illness, invalidity, study grants, family and child benefits, social exclusion, housing benefits) stood lower in 2016 than the European average: 1.3 percentage points lower (figure 2); however, the divide with respect to the EU has reduced since the year 2008, fundamentally as a consequence of the increase in unemployment benefits and subsidies.

Spain and Portugal, both with expenditure on family and child welfare very much below the European average, are two of the European countries that are least reducing the child poverty risk rate through transfers (figure 3). These reductions were greater in 2012 than in 2016, which reflects the special importance of the cushioning effect of the transfers during the severe recession experienced by both countries.

The European countries that are most reducing the risk of child poverty thanks to social transfers are Austria, Denmark, Sweden and Germany. Unlike Spain and Portugal, these are countries with high levels of social expenditure and with child protection systems based on universal transfers. These types of transfers, such as the benefit paid out per child in Sweden, are a subjective right of the entire population. They are paid on the basis of having a child or minor in one’s care, and people are beneficiaries regardless of their individual or family income. In general, the amounts paid by these universal systems are usually more generous than those conditioned to income, and because a broader population benefits from them, they attract considerable social support and, therefore, face less risks of suffering cuts in periods of austerity.

In any case, Spain’s and Portugal’s expenditure on family and child welfare is much lower than the European average. Despite a slight recovery following the worst years of the crisis, investment in this area represents 0.8% of GDP in Portugal, barely half the average European investment. As for Spain, investment in this area is even lower: around 0.5% of GDP, the lowest percentage in the European Union.

In relative terms with regard to total transfers, Spain is situated among the five European countries in which transfers targeting children represent a lower percentage (figure 4): barely 3.3% of the total in the year 2016, versus the European average of 9%. As a consequence of the crisis, the percentage of transfers targeting families and children with respect to the total fell in 2012, subsequently recovering towards 2016. In Portugal, this percentage was 4.5% both in 2012 and in 2016. This highlights two facts: firstly, that there has been no backing of a robust policy of family and child transfers, neither in times of prosperity nor in times of crisis. Secondly, that those transfers respond worse than other types of transfers to the cyclical fluctuations of economic activity, in particular of transfers for unemployment. In other words, while transfers for unemployment automatically increase enormously at times of crisis, the same does not happen with transfers for families and children, which have a much smaller and slower response to the economic situation because they are awarded on the basis of the previous year’s income.

Within this context of limitation of resources, it is very important to know who they should be targeted towards and how it is most efficient to invest them. In this sense, Bárcena-Martín et al. (2018) have evaluated the impact of family transfers in a more detailed way based on data on income and living conditions in the European Union (EU-SILC). Their analysis leaves no room for doubt: concentrating social transfers on children is more effective in fighting child poverty than channelling them in a more generic way towards the entire population based on income.

Both alternatives reduce the child poverty risk rate, but transfers conditioned to income do so to a lesser extent. Specifically, if we redistribute social transfers, increasing by one percentage point spending on transfers exclusively conditioned by income, the probability of a child being at risk of poverty falls by between 2 and 2.3%. In contrast, if we increase by that same percentage point our spending targeting children, that same probability falls by between 5.7% and 6.5%, in other words, approximately three times more. These differences are maintained for both 2012 and 2016 alike.

However, timing variations are definitely important when employment is taken into account. Thus, it is observed that in 2012 a country’s level of employment was largely related with the child poverty risk. In contrast, by 2016 the employment situation in itself had ceased to be a fundamental explanatory aspect of child poverty. This difference indicates that, in contexts of labour precarity, and high levels of seasonality and part- time working, like those that characterise numerous European countries at present, household employment and child poverty do not seem to maintain a strong correspondence. In other words, the important thing is not so much whether people work or not, but how much they work and in what conditions.

In any case, it is important to take into account the limitations of this analysis, since it does not consider other variables such as benefits such as tax allowances based on number of children, which in the case of Spain do exist and which especially benefit the middle classes.

Child poverty is a problem that, in countries such as Spain and Portugal, transcends the economic cycle. Child poverty risk rates were already high before the economic crisis in these two countries, then worsened during it and even today have not returned to pre crisis levels. The evidence suggests that transfers targeting children constitute a better public policy option for fighting child poverty than generic transfers conditioned by income.

BÁRCENA-MARTÍN, E., M.C. BLANCO-ARANA and S. PÉREZ-MORENO (2018): «Social transfers and child poverty in European countries: propoor targeting or pro-child targeting?», Journal of Social Policy, 47(4).

EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/ database.

EU-SILC longitudinal UDB (2012), version August 2015, Brussels: Eurostat.

EU-SILC longitudinal UDB (2016), version November 2018, Brussels: Eurostat

Poverty during childhood has lifelong consequences. It is often accompanied by material deprivation, a lack of educational and leisure opportunities and strong stigmatisation. The economic recession that began in 2008 had dramatic consequences for children and aggravated a situation that was already very worrying beforehand. Children’s welfare worsened especially from 2008 to 2014 and, despite a slight improvement in recent years, child poverty rates today are still among the highest in Europe.

The approach that has been used traditionally to analyse poverty is that of relative poverty, which takes into account the economic resources that an individual has in relation to the standard of living of the society in which he or she lives. This approach considers as poor those people living in a household with an income below 60% of the equivalised median income (also taking into account the number and ages of household members).

If we use this relative approach to measuring poverty (figure 1) we observe that, from 2008 to 2013, the childhood poverty rate remained quite stable, and it increased slightly from 2013 to 2014. The poverty rate was already very high before the start of the economic crisis. Thus, the rise in poverty in 2014 meant that 30.2% of children in Spain were living under the poverty threshold, whereas for the general population this percentage stood at 22.1%. Subsequently, between 2015 and 2017, despite the growth of the economy, the childhood poverty rate only decreased very slightly and settled at around 29%. The year 2018 points to a faint improvement but it is still unkown whether this tendency will be confirmed in the future.

The results are even more concerning if we analyse the data on anchored poverty (figure 2). This measurement better reflects the impoverishment of society during a period of crisis; it is calculated by anchoring the poverty threshold at a moment in time (in this case, 2008) and updating it with the evolution in prices to take into account possible changes in the cost of living (Ayllón, 2015, 2017). Unlike the relative poverty measurement, with this approach the poverty threshold does not decline over the course of time even if the incomes of the population as a whole do so.

When analysing the data on anchored poverty (figure 2), we observe an important deterioration in the situation of children in Spain during the crisis. In just six years the poverty rate rose from 26.9% (2008) to 38.9% (2014) among the child population. This worsening of the economic situation was general for the entire population but particularly intense in the case of children and young people. In 2014, four out of every ten children were living under the anchored poverty threshold. From 2014 onwards, with the improvement of the general economic situation, the anchored poverty rate for children decreased until it stood at 29.9% in 2018. Even so, it is worth underlining that the anchored poverty rate among children is still much higher than it was prior to the crisis.

The economic crisis did not affect all children in the same way. Their parents’ relationship with the labour market and the composition of the family structure are two main factors that help explain poverty risk during the early years of life.

One way of evaluating the impact of the crisis on child welfare consists of analysing the number of children who live in households with low labour intensity. The members of these households work less than 20% of their potential and, therefore, have virtually no income originating from the labour market. There is a close relationship between living in a household with low labour intensity and suffering childhood poverty. This relationship, however, is not solely the consequence of the economic crisis: in 2008, some 71.7% of children living in households with a low labour intensity were poor. This circumstance is an example of the lack of protection suffered by minors living in households with low labour intensity, even in times of economic prosperity.

In 2008, some 7.2% of adults and 4.2% of children were living in households with low labour intensity (figure 3). From that point onwards, and due to the rise in unemployment, the risk also increased of living in a household of this type, until it reached a high point in 2014 when some 14.3% of minors were living in this situation. During the economic crisis, the relationship between child poverty and households with low labour intensity also intensified (figure 4). And from 2011 onwards, eight out of every ten children that lived in households with low labour intensity were poor. From 2014 onwards, the percentage of children living in households with low labour intensity has declined although, as happens with the data on anchored poverty, the figures are still higher than they were prior to the crisis. The most concerning point is that in the last years of the period analysed, the relationship between child poverty and households with low labour intensity has intensified to such an extent that almost nine out of every ten children living in a household with low labour intensity are poor.

The risk of child poverty varies according to the composition of the family household and whether the child’s parents are in employment or not (figure 5). The highest risk is suffered by children who either live in single-parent households where the father or mother does not work, or who live with both parents and neither of the two work. Especially serious is the economic condition of children living with both parents out of work, a situation that, despite the growth of the economy in recent years, has worsened. In 2018, eight out of ten children living with two parents where none of the two worked were poor (in 2008, the figure was seven out of every ten).

The children with the greatest protection are those who live with both parents and both parents are working. When only one of the two is working, however, living with both parents does not necessarily guarantee a decent standard of living, because, as we have seen at the start of the period studied, over three out of every ten children in this situation were living below the poverty threshold. The situation for this group of children has barely improved in recent years; in 2018 over 40% of children in this type of household were living in poverty.

Children who live in large families face an especially high risk of poverty, particularly if there is only one parent in the household. However, the situation of single-parent households with a single child is that which has deteriorated most over the last ten years (graph 6).

The results on economic poverty, which only take into account household income, can be complemented by observing the evolution of various indicators on material deprivation. These indicators include a multidimensional perspective and consider, for example, people’s access to various commodities, or the capacity to live in housing offering minimum living standards. Table 1 shows the percentage of children in each of the diverse material deprivation indicators.

As shown in this table, there is a very high percentage of children who are still suffering significant deprivations today. In the period 2015- 2018, some 3.4% of children were living in households that could not afford a meal with meat or fish every other day, while 9.9% were living in households that could not keep the home at an adequate temperature and 15.3% had great difficulties in making it to the end of the month, among others. Such levels of deprivation will leave a mark on the development of these children that will endure throughout their entire lives (Ermisch et al., 2012).

AYLLÓN, S. (2015): Infancia, pobreza y crisis económica, Barcelona: Obra Social ”la Caixa”.

AYLLÓN, S. (2017): «Growing up in poverty: children and the Great Recession in Spain», in B. CANTILLON, Y. C, S. HANDA and B. NOLAN (eds.): Children of austerity: impact of the Great Recession on child poverty in rich countries, Nueva York: Oxford University Press.

ERMISCH, J., M. JäNTTI and T. SMEEDING (eds.) (2012): From parents to children: the intergenerational transmission of advantage, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Due to the economic crisis and coinciding with the end of the expansion of Spain's education system, the idea has spread among the public that, unlike in the past, investing in human capital is no longer useful for moving up the social ladder. However, available data reveals that this is not the case. Even during economic recessions, educational qualifications protect individuals from unemployment, increase their prospects for social mobility and reduce the likelihood of downward mobility.

The current economic crisis, with its detrimental impact on the material well-being of broad segments of society, has damaged the positive image education has enjoyed as a means for social advancement. At the same time as concerns about the increase in inequality have grown, the media has spread the notion that the education system has lost much of its capacity to improve the social conditions of holders of educational degrees and other qualifications.

We have all seen reports about university graduates working as waiters or cleaning hotel rooms, and read stories of young researchers and doctors who have been forced to move to other countries, looking for opportunities not available in Spain. Although it is not always explicitly stated, the cases of over-qualified job-holders and the emigration of talent have led to the idea that education, above all in times of crisis, is simply not that useful.

As is well-known, over much of the twentieth century, the proportion of Spaniards with high school diplomas as well as those with university degrees increased from generation to generation (Requena and Bernardi, 2005). This progression has now come to a halt and the proportion of the population with such qualifications has even begun to decline among those born after 1980. If the proportion of persons with secondary and university educations is no longer expanding, one might conclude that this is because education no longer pays off as it did in the past. According to this pessimistic narrative, the main engine behind social mobility in Spain has broken down or is at least not functioning well. Although it is not clear that those who defend this notion are aware of all its implications, if true, the futility of education as a means of social advancement would be of such great importance that it would require urgent attention, and for at least two reasons.

First of all, it would represent a radical departure from what prevailing theory says about education, considering it as the social elevator par excellence in modern societies.  In this regard, Carabaña (1999 and 2004) showed convincingly that over most of the 20th century, with educational qualifications being equal, social origin did not have a significant impact on individuals' access to the professional and managerial class. Thus, education level was more important than social origin for social advancement.

Secondly, the inability of the education system to serve as a social leveller would imply – if it were true – the disappearance of the main social mechanism to guarantee equal opportunity in contemporary societies. Whether concerned about distributive justice or the efficient distribution of talent, whoever believes in the virtues of a meritocracy should take very seriously this disturbing news that education is no longer fulfilling its commendable role of paving the way for upward social mobility.

In short, has education lost its capacity to be a social elevator? I will try to answer this question examining the available evidence and will argue that educational qualifications in Spain continue to be - as they were during much of the last century - an effective resource for improving individuals' socioeconomic position. Although the available data for the most recent period are scarce and not as complete and detailed as we would like, the data provide at least three arguments demonstrating that education in Spain helps to improve the social position of individuals and that it will likely continue to do so in the future: (1) education increases the likelihood of  upward social mobility; (2)  it reduces the risk of downward social mobility and (3) reduces the risk of becoming unemployed.

As we will see, in Spain, educational qualifications foster the advancement of children toward higher social strata than their parents. In other words, education promotes upward intergenerational mobility, which is precisely what occurred among the generations born in the first seven decades of the 20th century. We can rely on Carabaña again on this point, as he noted "education in general, and the university in particular, are an effective vehicle for upward social mobility.... The effectiveness of education as an access channel to the university educated professional class has historically been the same for all social classes" (2004: 219). As there is no doubt regarding the past, the interesting question is whether or not education continues to be this privileged channel toward more desirable social positions for younger generations .

This question can be answered by turning to the Living Conditions Survey, a periodic survey whose questionnaire in 2011 included a module focused on the intergenerational transmission of poverty,  which contained information on the occupation of parents and children. This module, which has not been included in the survey since then, was applied to survey participants born between 1951 and 1985; the youngest of whom have already had to face, in the beginning of their working careers, a labour market that since 2008 has been seriously impacted by the recession.

Due to the relatively reduced size of the sample that responded to this module (N=18,304) and the lack of detail regarding the father's occupation, we consider only three major social classes: the working class (skilled and unskilled manual labour), the middle class (small business owners and routine non-manual labour) and the professional and managerial class. These three major classes result from aggregating the 11 original classes in the now classic Goldthorpe class scheme known as the EGP (Erikson and Goldthorpoe, 1992). The different education levels are also grouped into three major categories: less than secondary education, lower and advanced secondary education, and university education.

To illustrate our hypothesis that education continues to be a good means for social advancement in Spain, we first look at the rates of mobility into the professional and managerial class. These rates are the horizontal percentages in graph 3 and represent exit or class destination (outflow), in other words, the percentage of individuals in different classes of origin that have ended up in the professional and managerial class. In addition, they measure the likelihood of the children of parents of each of these three classes of being professionals or managers. As is obvious, to evaluate the impact of education on mobility, we must compare the rates of access to managerial and professional occupations for the three levels of education chosen.

The data show (graph 1) that those with university degrees have higher rates - that is, greater likelihood - of access to the professional and managerial class than those without a university education. The importance of education is revealed by the fact that persons with high education levels are far more likely to be employed in more desirable occupations than are those with low education levels, regardless of their class origins.

In terms of relative mobility (that which compares the mobility of one class with others), we find that among individuals that come from the working class, those who have a university education are 14 times as likely to be employed in professional and managerial occupations than those who did not complete secondary education. The children of middle-class parents with higher education are three times as likely to become managers and professionals as their middle class peers that did not complete secondary education. The children of professionals and managers who get a university education are twice as likely to remain in their class of origin as those who have less than a secondary education. The probabilities of reaching or remaining in the professional and managerial class for those with university degrees in comparison to those who completed secondary school are approximately  5 to 1 for individuals of working-class origin and 3 to 1 for those from the middle class or the professional and managerial class.

In short, we find that educational qualifications provide a great advantage for upward mobility in all social classes; in addition, the relative advantage obtained is greater, the lower an individual's social class of origin.

This does not mean that there is no inequality in educational opportunities linked to social class, as the survey reveals that 63% of the children of professionals and managers obtain university degrees, while only 26% of the children of working-class parents do. Nor does it mean that the likelihood of mobility is no longer connected to social origin, as the children of professionals and managers are 2.8 times more likely to be professionals and managers than the children of working class parents and 1.4 times more likely than the children of middle-class parents. What these data really show is that educational attainment is the best way to avoid the inequality of opportunities resulting from social origin.

Educational qualifications not only foster upward mobility, but they also reduce the risk of an individual falling from their social class of origin to a lower class. To examine this possibility,  the rates of mobility used in the previous section are again useful, calculated now for cases of individuals of middle-class and professional- and managerial-class origin descending to the working class. First of all, children born in middle-class families have a much lower risk of ending up in the working class if they have a university education (11%) than if they only have a secondary school education (49%) or less (66%). Secondly, regarding children of the professional and managerial class, one third of those that do not complete secondary education descend to the working class, a similar proportion is found for those with secondary school educations. However, this downward mobility only occurred with 8% of those with a university degree.

These results can be seen in graph 2, which shows that in the two higher classes, the risk of descending to the working class is inversely related to educational qualifications. Obviously, the children of working class parents cannot, due to the scheme we have used, descend on the social scale, but they can remain in their social class of origin. In this regard, it is not surprising to find that a lower level of education is associated with remaining in the working class: six out of ten individuals of working class origin that do not complete secondary education remain in the working class, in comparison to 52% with a secondary school education, and 17% with a university degree. In addition, (although these data are not shown in graph 2) individuals with low levels of education are over-represented among those from the professional and managerial class that descend to the middle class.

For their part, the children of the middle class and the professional and managerial class with university degrees have a much lower likelihood of descending to the working class than others of the same social origin with lower levels of education. In fact, even if they have not finished secondary school, the children of the professional and managerial class are at half the risk of moving to a lower social class than the children of working class parents are of remaining in that class. In short, education is very effective in helping individuals avoid downward mobility and a lack of education, in contrast, strengthens the effects of social class of origin on downward mobility.

The third reason education fosters social mobility is because it protects individuals from unemployment, that scourge of Spain's economy that has reduced economic development, reduced the well-being of the individuals and families affected and frustrated the life projects of those who suffer it. Research on the impact of unemployment (Arulampalam, 2001) has shown the lasting damaging effects on those who do not find employment and are therefore unable to work at economically active ages. Being unemployed, above all when young (Mroz and Savage, 2006), increases the likelihood of later working in jobs with low wages and poor working conditions.

In addition to the loss in wages, unemployment can negatively impact family relations, lower self-esteem and damage health. For all these reasons, being unemployed reduces future possibilities for intragenerational upward mobility; in other words, the possibility that individuals can improve their employment paths over time.

In Spain, there is abundant evidence showing that unemployment is not equally distributed among persons with different education levels (EducaINEE, 2013; López-Bazo and Motellón, 2013; OECD, 2014); on the contrary, the risk of unemployment is inversely related to educational qualifications. Data from the Active Population Survey (graph 3) are very clear: the higher the level of education, the less likelihood of becoming unemployed.

The protection that education provides from unemployment in Spain is very clear, and this is the case not only in periods of economic growth but also in times of recession. Although unemployment rates among the most educated in Spain are more than double that for the OECD and the EU (OECD, 2014 and 2015), the highest rates in Spain are found among individuals with low education levels, and this is true regardless of the phase of the economic cycle. This is not surprising if we look at what jobs have been destroyed during the recession: primarily, the worst jobs, that is, those requiring low qualifications.

Education not only protects individuals from unemployment during both periods of growth and recession, it also, and even more importantly,  protects both men and women and different age groups. The distribution of unemployment by sex and age in Spain is well-known: the unemployment rate for women is higher than that of men, and it is higher among youth.  The unemployment rate among those who are 20 to 24 years of age is double that for the overall population and much higher than the unemployment rate of mature workers. However, if we consider men and women separately, and if we look at unemployment by age groups, the unemployment rate is lower, the higher the level of education (graph 4). This inverse relationship between education and unemployment is significant and clear for both sexes and among almost all age groups.

In short, in a country with a labour market unable to satisfy the aspirations of a large proportion of the population, having a high level of education is clearly one of the best forms of protection against unemployment, and this is the case regardless of sex, age and phase of the economic cycle. Education is an optimal instrument for avoiding the obstacles that reduce career advancement; protecting individuals from unemployment, it boosts careers by fostering intragenerational mobility.

Available data refutes the idea that education no longer serves as a social elevator, and this is the case despite the continuing connection between opportunities for social ascent and social origin. Education continues being a means to intragenerational and intergenerational upward mobility and an effective barrier to descent.  Professional and management occupations in general require university degrees. Without one it is very difficult to reach the higher social strata of contemporary societies or remain in them.                         

A significant proportion of the social mobility that we see in comparing the position of parents and children - above all those with university educations - is structural or forced mobility, that is, produced by changes in occupational structure, and not by the mere circulation of persons among the different positions in a fixed distribution of occupations. In other words, in Spain, the continuing growth in professional and managerial positions (Requena et al., 2011 and 2013) is the cause of the upward social mobility induced by educational achievement. This is what accounts for the mobility of the recent past and, as available data shows, this has also been the experience of the most recent generations to join the labour market.

With more detailed data than we have presented here, we could apply a similar argument to vocational education, as vocational qualifications are necessary for carrying out technical jobs and holders of such qualifications have better prospects of finding well-paid work than individuals without such qualifications (Carabaña, 2014).

What is going to happen in the future with our current youngest generations can only be a matter of conjecture. But if occupational change continues to lead to an increase in the number of professionals, managers and skilled technicians in detriment to jobs that require less skill, the future of education as a lever for social ascent is assured.

In short, this is what we would expect to occur in those societies we refer to as knowledge societies: the growing importance of work that demands high qualifications in the occupational structure will foster upward mobility. If this is the case, education will continue providing a decisive advantage in the struggle for social advancement.

Miguel Requena          
Chair Professor of Sociology, UNED

Arulampalam, W. (2001): «Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemployment on wages», Economic Journal, 111.

Caínzos, M. (2015): «La opinión pública sobre la educación en España: entre el catastrofismo y la satisfacción», Revista Española de Sociología, 23.

Carabaña, J. (2004): «Educación y movilidad social», in V. Navarro (ed.): El Estado de Bienestar en España, Madrid: Tecnos.

— (1999): Dos estudios sobre movilidad intergeneracional, Madrid: Fundación Argentaria-Visor.

— (2014): «Apuntes sobre la Formación Profesional en España», in La Formación Profesional ante el desempleo, Cuadernos 13, Madrid: Círculo Cívico de Opinión.

EducaINEE (2013): «Panorama de la educación. Interim report 2015», Boletín de Educación, 40 [http://www.mecd.gob.es/inee].

Erikson, R., and J. Goldthorpe (1992): The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies, Oxford: Clarendon.

López-Bazo, E., and E. Motellón (2013): «Disparidades en los mercados de trabajo regionales. El papel de la educación», Papeles de Economía Española, 138.

Mroz, T.A., and T.H. Savage (2006): «The long-term effects of youth unemployment», Journal of Human Resources, 41.

OECD (2015): Education at a Glance Interim Report: Update of Employment and Educational Attainment Indicators, Paris: OECD

— (2014): Education at a Glance 2014: OECD Indicators, Paris: OECD [http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eag-2014-en].

Requena, M, and F. Bernardi (2005): «El sistema educativo», in J.J. González y M. Requena, eds., Tres décadas de cambio social en España, Madrid: Alianza.

Requena, M., J. Radl and L. Salazar (2011): «Estratificación y clases sociales», in Informe España 2011. Una interpretación de su realidad social, Madrid: Fundación Encuentro.

Requena, M., L. Salazar and J. Radl (2013): Estratificación social, Madrid: McGraw Hill.

The socioeconomic composition of attendance at publicly-funded arts events has interested researchers and policy makers for decades, with marked differences in attendance by social class, particularly educational level, persisting over time in almost every country, including Spain. Drawing on a 2013 Eurobarometer survey, this article outlines the markedly uneven attendance level at publicly-funded arts events, and the reasons for such non-attendance, by educational level. The data for Spain are remarkably similar to those for the EU as a whole. The main objectives of the paper are two-fold. First, to ascertain what the reason for these patterns is and to show that it is probably down to preferences. Second, to question whether or not the uneven pattern of attendance should be a policy concern, given that there are many other objectives of arts funding not linked to this issue.

The socioeconomic composition of attendance at publicly-funded arts events has interested researchers and policy-makers for decades (see O’Hagan, 1996 and 2014) and re-emerges as an issue every few years, especially when the funding levels of, say, a European opera house or art museum or symphony orchestra are up for public debate (O’Hagan, 2014).  In the past, the main concern was that some art forms are elitist in terms of attendance, and at the same time are the recipients of large-scale public funding, especially when this is crudely converted into subsidy per attendee. Such funding, therefore, is seen as highly inequitable.  This concern remains. 

The article starts with a discussion of what is meant by access, attendance and how performance in this regard is measured.  It then briefly examines the evidence in relation to the pattern of attendance by educational level at arts events with large-scale public funding. Later, it considers the barriers that might be causing the very uneven attendance levels.  Finally, it examines why these barriers exist and the possible general overall policy implications.

The main conclusions of the paper are two-fold. Firstly, to argue that the chief reason for the uneven pattern of attendance is likely related simply to different preferences by educational group and not to price or other factors. Secondly, to argue that the uneven pattern of attendance should not perhaps be a policy concern, given that there are many other objectives of arts funding not linked to this issue.

It is possible to speak of access to the arts on at least four levels.  First, there is the issue of access to the supply of arts services to consumers, for example, do all actors, violinists and production managers have access to employment? Second, one may speak of access to the decision-making process of arts policy and the organization of arts events, something that may impact the other aspects of access.  Third, one may also refer to the consumer and the consumption of arts services or simply attendance at arts events. Finally, there is access to the ‘making/doing’ of art, in classes or at an amateur/personal and community level. 

This paper will concentrate only on the third aspect of access to the arts, or what shall be called from this point on attendance at the arts.  The first issue that arises is: to what type of art form does access apply?  The primary focus of this paper will be on the art forms that absorb the bulk of public expenditure on the arts. This is because concern over access to attendance arises mostly in relation to areas of the arts where large-scale public expenditure is involved, and this means ballet/dance/opera, theatre, museums, libraries and historic monuments.

At the very least, equal access could be defined in terms of equality of rights to access cultural life, these rights being the absence of legal and institutionalized barriers to entry to a given institution or system. This effectively ensures the absence of discrimination in the access of anyone to the arts and it is an equality objective with which few would argue.

Equality of formal rights does not guarantee more equal attendance at the arts.  A second and more useful indicator of equality therefore, might be equality of opportunity. This involves not only providing formal rights, but enabling and encouraging certain sections to attend/participate on an equal footing with others.  For example, if those on low incomes are to attend on equal terms with those on middle incomes, then a policy of zero or low entry charges for attendance at the arts might be necessary to ensure equality of opportunity to attend. It may also be necessary to encourage attendance of certain groups, through a proactive policy of advertising and/or education regarding the arts.  This is clearly a more far-reaching concept of equal access.

Enabling and encouraging equal attendance facilitates but does not, of course, ensure equal attendance at publicly-funded arts events. Thus, a further equality objective might relate to equality in terms of outcome or success, i.e. actual equality of attendance in the arts.  This is the focus of the rest of this paper.

Attendance rates are central to any analysis of access to publicly-funded arts.  Overall, they refer to the percentage of the population which attends the arts in a given time period, usually the preceding twelve months. 

Figures broken down by different variables to show the pattern of attendance/participation by income, educational level, age, sex, ethnic group, region, etc., are also usually available, and from an equality point of view, it is these figures which are of most relevance (see for example Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016).  This paper will concentrate on the variation in attendance by educational level, as this is the dominant predictor of variation in attendance rates in the arts. 

A very high percentage of EU citizens do not attend the large-scale public expenditure areas of the arts. For example, 81 per cent in 2013 had not been to a ballet, dance performance or an opera in the previous twelve months. The corresponding figures for going to the theatre and visiting a public library were 72 and 66 per cent. 

The figures for Spain very closely match the overall EU figures: 84 per cent of Spaniards had not been to ballet/dance/opera in the previous twelve months, the corresponding figures for theatre and public libraries being 78 and 68 per cent. In fact, in relation to much of the data presented in Eurobarometer there is a striking similarity between the overall EU figures and those for Spain, a situation that does not apply for many other countries.

The attendance rates for the EU are considerably higher than those for the US, but it is difficult to know whether the data are directly comparable. What is of more relevance though, for our purposes, is the variation by educational level. This variation is very marked, especially in relation to attending ballet/opera/dance, visiting museums, going to the theatre and visiting a public library, four of the major areas of public expenditure on the arts in the EU (Table 1). 

For example, just 7 per cent of those educated up to the age of 15 had been to ballet/dance/opera in the previous twelve months, whereas 29 per cent of those educated up to twenty-plus years had been. This picture is replicated across the other categories as can be seen clearly in Table 1.

These patterns are also replicated over time and across countries (see Falk and Katz-Gerro, 2016).  There is an almost unbreakable circle at work here. Parents with higher educational qualifications attend arts events more than others and also encourage their children to take classes in the arts when young, reinforcing the existing patterns of unequal attendance by educational level into the future.

The evidence above in relation to composition of attendees by educational level probably confirms a picture that most people are familiar with from their own countries, including Spain.  It is a picture that has changed little, to the best of our knowledge, in any country in the last forty years.  Why then are arts ministries and other arts bodies still ‘going through the motions’ of emphasizing the importance of access for everyone to attendance at publicly-funded arts events when it is known that so little changes? (For Spain, see Villaroya et al., 2015)  A second question is why has so little changed? In other words, what are the barriers that are preventing greater access to attendance at the high arts for those with low educational attainment? The latter question is the focus of this section.

Monetary barriers are often cited as the cause of the unequal patterns of attendance observed above, as those with low educational attainment will most likely also have low incomes.  These barriers may either be the cost of admission, considered in absolute terms or relative to the price of substitute goods and services; or any of the many ancillary costs incurred in attending the arts outside the home.

Non-monetary barriers may be either physical or psychological or contain elements of both.  First, there is the well-documented tendency of the high arts market to strong centralization not only towards, but within, larger cities. The physical surroundings, as well as the location and type of production, may also hinder greater participation in the high arts by those on low incomes and/or with low educational attainment. In recognition of this, governments have attempted to ‘take high arts out’ of the imposing institutions in which they are housed/take place, moving them to more familiar surroundings such as schools, community halls, churches, etc.

People with a low educational level may suffer from worse health problems than other groups or belong to older age groups and hence might be less mobile. This could explain their relatively very low attendance at not just the arts but also other activities.

The real barrier to greater attendance at the ‘high arts’ by those with low educational attainment may relate simply to preferences. It could be argued that the ‘equation’ is simple: people with certain abilities/aptitudes stay longer in the education system, gain higher levels of qualifications, earn larger incomes, and tend to have a greater preference for certain art forms. It could be argued that people with similar educational attainment, but different exposure to the arts when they were young, will have different attendance rates when they are adults.  However, these differences, even if they could be demonstrated, are likely to be slight when compared to the differences by broad educational category.  If preferences are the real barrier to greater attendance by those with low incomes/low educational attainment at certain art forms, then it is no wonder that policy in the past has failed to redress the situation. 

Strong evidence for this can be seen in Keaney (2008).  She reported, in relation to the large English attendance studies, that many people asserted that the real barrier for them was that they are not interested, which is another way perhaps of saying the publicly-funded high arts are not part of their preferences.  Why this is the case is another issue but the evidence suggests that an ability to appreciate certain art forms takes time and a certain level of cognitive ability, increasing with each successive attendance (at least up to a point) when familiarity and understanding accumulate.  What Keaney (2008) pointed out unambiguously either way is that price is not the real problem.

It might be interesting to consider the situation in relation to Spain.   In the EU as a whole, for example, 50 per cent indicated lack of interest as the reason for not attending ballet/dance/ opera, 44 per cent being the figure for Spain.  Only 14 per cent of EU citizens quoted ‘too expensive’ compared to 21 per cent for Spain.  This pattern is repeated for visits to a library.  In the EU, 43 per cent said lack of interest, 27 per cent lack of time, and only 3 per cent mentioned expense.  The corresponding figures for Spain were 44, 28 and 3 per cent, almost identical when adjusting for sampling error.  A staggering 72 per cent of Spaniards list either lack of interest or time as the reasons they do not visit a library.

A 2013 Eurobarometer survey throws further considerable light on the debate in relation to the variation by educational level (see Table 2).  Respondents were asked to identify the barriers to accessing culture, in terms of lack of interest, lack of time, cost, limited supply in area, lack of information and other/don’t know. The results are striking.  As seen in Table 2, among those with the lowest attendance by far, namely those educated only up to the age of 15, almost half of them indicated lack of interest as the main reason for not attending. 

The variation by educational level is also striking.  For example, just 17 per cent of those educated to the age of 20+ indicated lack of interest as the reason for not attending heritage sites and 26 per cent for not going to theatre. Only 4 per cent of those educated up to the age of 15 quoted ‘expense’ as a reason, lack of time was the second most important reason, followed some way back by ‘limited choice’ in area.  Lack of time comes out strongly as the most important factor for those educated up to the age of 20+: this is most striking in relation to visiting heritage sites.  As much as 47 per cent of them indicated lack of time as a reason for not attending, as opposed to just 17 per cent due to lack of interest and 6 per cent due to expense.

Put simply, it could be argued, on the basis of the data presented earlier and elsewhere, that people with lower levels of education have little preference for, and hence wish to attend, the so-called high arts, but that they do appreciate and participate in art forms other than the heavily publicly-funded arts, for example in the case of music, classic rock, church, gospel, Latin and folk music.  

The central focus of this paper is the skewed composition by educational level of attendance at main publicly-funded arts events and the possible barriers to a more even distribution. Evidence on both issues was provided. It is clear that the variation by educational level is very marked indeed. It is also clear that the reasons for this have little to do with price, but mainly to do with preferences.  What then, it might be asked, determines the different preferences for publicly-funded arts activities by educational level?

Much has been written on the role of cultural participation and status. Notten et al., 2013, give a summary of the key literature.  They particularly examine the contrasting explanations for the variation by educational level in cultural participation, namely status and cognitive capacity. The first of these postulates that people participate in cultural life chiefly as an expression of their social status. Thus, according to this argument well-educated individuals participate in high culture because it indicates their belonging to the elite.  If cultural consumption is driven by status motivation, then the variation in association between education and cultural participation is to be expected on these grounds alone.

However, there are others who strongly argue that cultural participation is primarily a function of an individual’s cognitive capacity.  In this context, education is seen as a proxy for a person’s information-processing capacity.  Individuals with greater capacity are then, it is argued, driven to seek cultural activities that offer more complex information in order to satisfy their cognitive needs.  Thus, according to Notten et al. (2013) a ‘person’s educational level relates to a specific form of cultural participation not because of the status benefits that such participation may generate or express, but merely because of the information-processing competencies it requires’ (p. 8).

The evidence in this paper certainly suggests that it is not price or lack of good-quality suitable facilities that deter attendance at the high arts.  Lack of interest is by far the main barrier and this could arise from no interest in status among the lower educational groups and/or lack of information-processing capacity.  Whichever of these two explanations is correct, it implies that acting on price or through outreach programmes in the arts will make little difference to the attendance at the high arts by educational level, something that is supported by the evidence presented earlier. This brings the discussion back to the equity issues associated with continued public funding of the high arts.

The main policy concern arising from an uneven pattern of attendance by educational level at arts events is that the bulk of public money goes to high art forms, namely those art forms not attended by those with low incomes/educational attainment.

It should be remembered that public funding of the high arts is justified not solely —not even mainly— on the grounds of improving access for those with low educational attainment.  For example, the innovation/experimental argument for public subsidy is not dependent on the level and/or composition of the initial audiences for the subsidized art form. Neither are the other collective benefit arguments relating to national identity, economic spillover effects and national pride/prestige necessarily linked to the composition of attendance.

Caution is called for on other fronts as well before one can say that public funding of high arts is regressive and diverts money from the poor to the rich. First, public subsidy may in fact benefit the producers and not the consumers of the art form in question and the socioeconomic profile of producers could differ significantly from that of consumers of high art.  The issue of whether it is producers (artists, managers, etc.) who benefit (in the form of better wages and working conditions) or consumers (in the form of lower prices or better-quality productions) from the subsidy is critical to this debate and is a largely unresolved issue. 

The crucial question in this debate though is the extent of the public benefit from subsidies to the so-called high arts.  The higher the public benefit, the lower the subsidy, if any, of the private benefit of the attendees. While attempts have been made to estimate the scale of the public benefit, the difficulties of estimation in this regard are so formidable that at the end of the day the judgment/decision will be one for politicians.

It is important to emphasize again that an uneven distribution of attendance at publicly-funded arts events does not necessarily reflect badly on the arts policy.  There are other objectives of arts funding, such as encouraging innovation and experimentation in the arts or attracting foreign tourists/businesses, which could offer great benefits to the general taxpayer even though a very skewed distribution of attendance was evident.

Therefore, it might be better for policy to concentrate on the first two aspects of access discussed earlier, namely ensuring equality of rights and equality of opportunity, and, once these are assured, not to be too concerned with equality of attendance. In this case though, evidence has to be continuously sought that there are benefits from publicly funding the arts to the general taxpayer, and not simply to those who attend.

John W. O’Hagan

Department of Economics

Trinity College Dublin 2, Ireland

Falk, M., & T. Katz-Gerro (2016): ‘Cultural participation in Europe: can we identify common determinants?’, Journal of Cultural Economics, 40 (2)

Keaney, E. (2008): “Understanding arts audiences: existing data and what it tells us,” Cultural Trends 17 (June).

Notten, N., B. Lancee, H. van de Werfhorst & H. Ganzeboom (2013): Educational stratification in cultural participation: cognitive competence or status motivation? Amsterdam: GINI Discussion Paper.

O’Hagan, J. (1996), “Access to and participation in the arts: the case of those with low incomes/educational attainment,” Journal of Cultural Economics 20 (3).

O’Hagan, J. (2014):  ‘Attendance at/participation in the arts by educational level: evidence and issues’, Homo Oeconomicus 31(3).

Villarroya, A. in cooperation with Ateca-Amestoy, V. (2015):  ‘Spain’, in a Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe.

This article explores the issue of integrating sex and gender analysis into the funding, content and implementation process of research and innovation. Although a sex/gender-sensitive approach to research is rapidly becoming better embedded in certain research areas- for example, in biomedical research- in general, it is still under-recognised, not widely practised, and not well integrated into the research process. Yet, good policies and practices are vitally important to ensure that research results are equally valid for people of all genders and sexes, to improve global citizens’ lives in many ways and to help ensure that research and innovation are in tune with universities’ responsibilities to society.

The article is based on work carried out by an association of research-intensive universities (League of European Research Universities, LERU), which resulted in a policy paper that includes twenty recommendations for various stakeholders, including universities, funders, governments and journals.

What are the most common symptoms of a heart attack? Pain in the chest and arm(s), right? That is only half right, namely if you are a man. If you are a woman, you are more likely to exhibit nausea, general weakness, sweating or other symptoms. Men and their doctors are more likely to attribute chest pain to heart disease; women and their doctors are less likely to attribute their symptoms to heart disease. As a result, the so-called door to needle time for women who are admitted and diagnosed is significantly longer than for men (Dey et al., 2009).

Heart diseases, such as coronary artery disease, myocardial infarction and heart failure, often have different characteristics in men and women, which are linked both to sex and gender. The first is a biological concept, the latter a sociological concept, so that in heart disease it is a question of  physiology, chromosomes and hormones on the one side, and life-style and health-seeking behaviours on the other. Because heart disease research was for a long time focused mostly on men, the more typical female aspects of the disease were little known or recognised, with a consequent higher risk of suboptimal diagnosis and treatment, and higher mortality for women.

Luckily, that has been changing recently. The key point of this story, however, is that if research assumes that there is no significant difference between the sexes/genders, lives may be at stake. That is why it is vitally important to make sure that research results are equally valid for people of all genders and sexes, not just because it is the right thing to do, or because it is life-saving, but also because it saves money, improves the quality of research, leads to better products and services, and ultimately benefits all people and society at large.

Even when it may not be a question of life and death, it is essential that gender and sex analysis are properly – when needed - integrated into the research process. In health research, many diseases have been identified that affect women more seriously than men, such as cancer and osteoporosis. It is increasingly recognised that women and men may manifest and experience diseases differently, respond differently to treatment, metabolise drugs differently and respond differently to devices.

Some male/female differences can occur as early as during pregnancy and birth. Female infants, for instance, are more likely than males to contract HIV at birth, while male infants are more likely to be infected through breastfeeding. The differences between the sexes can be found at a very fundamental level, even in cells, cell lines and cell regulatory practices.

Remarkably little effort, however, has been spent on rigorously investigating and reporting the underlying sex and gender differences. For too long, medical research has not systematically focused on differences in disease prevalence, progression, clinical outcomes and responses to treatment between women and men. Too often it has been, and still may be, assumed that men can be used as the norm group for the entire population. As a result, women (and people who do not fit in the binary male-female scheme) continue to be under-represented in clinical trials and are frequently subject to medical practices based on data from a predominantly male population.

Women are not just under-represented in clinical trials. In laboratory studies and preclinical human research, male animals are much more frequently used than females. This is shown, for instance, in pain research: 79% of animal studies published in the journal Pain between 2001 and 2011 included males only, with only 8% of studies on females only, and a mere 4% explicitly designed to test for sex differences (the rest did not specify) (Buitendijk et al., 2011).

To be clear, sometimes it is not women, but men that are under-represented in the research. For example, because these diseases are perceived to be women’s illnesses, research has shown that eating disorders such as anorexia are under-diagnosed and under-treated in young men, even though they make up about a quarter of the cases (Räisänen and Hunt, 2015).

Moreover, while a gender-/sex-sensitive approach may seem more pertinent for biomedical research, it is by no means limited to it. On the contrary, researchers in all disciplines should and do ask themselves whether there are potentially sex and gender differences to be addressed in their research. Many examples are available - from urban transport to machine translation, employment, sustainable development, climate change, criminology, etc.

For instance, there are gender-related differences in the use of public and private means of transport, frequency and distance of travel, and patterns related to caring and parenting duties. A lack of gender analysis in transport research has resulted in under-reporting of the gender dimension of transport, which affects job opportunities, economic independence and well-being (Sánchez de Madariaga, 2013). When the gender/sex dimension is taken into account in research, it can lead to more innovative transport and urban planning policies, which help to improve people’s lives and to solve important societal challenges. In several Swedish cities, for example, snow-clearing priorities have been changed thanks to gender-/sex-sensitive research, resulting in more people getting to work and school faster with a lower likelihood of accidents.

Thus, a gender-/sex-sensitive approach in research is extremely valuable because it helps to answer societal challenges that all of us face. Whether it is about developing better transportation, adapting to climate change, finding solutions for ageing populations, solving energy challenges, and more, it has an important role to play in improving global citizens’ lives and ultimately in ensuring that research and innovation are in tune with universities’ responsibilities to society.

To give another example, analysing gender in relation to climate change and mitigation means comparing women’s and men’s behaviours and attitudes. Moreover, researchers must also ask: which women, which men? – and compare groups of women and men based on social factors, such as income, educational background and geographic location, which also predict climate footprint. Viewing women as an undifferentiated group and opposing this group to an undifferentiated group of men misses important factors that influence gendered behaviours. By studying not only gender/sex differences, but also by controlling for other social factors, one can avoid misleading stereotypes and false statistical correlations. More information about the interaction between gender and climate change research is available at the Gendered Innovations Project website (http://genderedinnovations.stanford.edu), which is a wonderful resource with many case studies and references on gender and sex in research.    

It is essential to involve scholars from the humanities and social sciences (SSH) in research aimed at solving societal challenges such as climate change, hunger, security, immigration and others. They bring important cultural, economic, historical, legal, psychological, sociological and other insights to these challenges, which pose not just scientific, technological, engineering or biomedical questions. Moreover, many SSH disciplines have a tradition of incorporating sex and gender analysis into research and have the methodological expertise for doing so. To solve societal challenges a multidisciplinary approach is extremely valuable, and incorporating SSH expertise and perspectives should be considered in all stages of the research process, not least right from the onset to help identify appropriate research questions and methods.

The latter point raises the issue that, just as with considering SSH issues at the earliest stages of societal challenge research, it is crucial that gender and sex analysis are taken into account at the very start. A gender-/sex-sensitive approach to research includes addressing potential sex and gender differences in each stage of the research cycle: at the outset, when governments, funders, universities and others make decisions about priorities for research spending; next, when researchers decide on the research focus, methodology and data collection and when they analyse and report on data; and finally, when researchers, journals and others disseminate research results and when  results are used by companies, governments or the public at large. A final point is that not all research topics will (need to) have a gender-/sex-sensitive dimension. When researchers have reasons to believe gender and sex will not constitute a factor in their research, they should explain this in their research funding proposal. Or when in the course of research no interactions with gender or sex are found, it is important to report that the question was posed but that no such effects were found.

While a gender/sex-sensitive approach in research is rapidly becoming better known and practised in certain research fields, in other areas it is still relatively unknown or not as well integrated in research practice as it should be. Awareness is increasing, but more can be done by researchers, universities, funders of research, and other stakeholders.

In a recent paper (Buitendijk i Maes, 2015), the League of European Research Universities has examined this issue. The report includes a varied set of examples showing the breadth and depth of research being performed at universities with a gender-/sex-sensitive approach. It also points to how universities are developing policies and practices to promote and support such an approach, with guidance documents for researchers, workshops to raise awareness and training, lectures and courses.

The paper formulates twenty recommendations for different stakeholders to act upon, emphasising the importance of support, promotion and resources for a gender-/sex-sensitive approach. For universities, the recommendations argue it is important that university leadership puts this issue on the agenda within the university and with others outside the university. Researchers need to be informed so they can assess whether or not it is important in their research and act accordingly. A recommendation for governments is that they should include a gender-sex dimension in research policies and programmes. Research funders can create financial incentives or support for researchers to do so. The EU funding programme Horizon 2020 can serve as a forward-looking model. Research journals should set standards for including the necessary information, with clear guidelines for authors.

Universities, governments, funders and journals have started to address the issue, but there is much work to be done. Concerted and systematic efforts are needed to raise awareness of and provide training to members of all research stakeholder communities. In addition, there is a need for links to and integration with other gender equality initiatives at all levels: through inclusion of this issue in government policies and strategies, funders’ programmes, universities’ gender equality strategies or action plans, research activities and researchers’ projects.

The European Commission, in its European Research Area (ERA) policy framework and in its Horizon 2020 funding programme, has emphasised the importance of integrating gender-sex analysis in research and innovation content. Next to fostering gender balance in H2020 research teams and ensuring gender balance in decision making, integrating gender-sex analysis into research and innovation content is included to improve the scientific quality and societal relevance of the produced knowledge, technology and/or innovation.

Guidance to applicants for EU projects states that a topic is considered gender-relevant when it and/or its findings affect individuals or groups of persons. In these cases, gender issues should be integrated at various stages of the action and when relevant, specific studies can be included.

The EC has identified many sub-fields where data show that a gender analysis can benefit research; these range from computer hardware and architecture to nanotechnology, oceanography, geosciences, organic chemistry, aeronautics, space medicine, biodiversity, ecology and biophysics, among others. These topics are flagged so applicants can easily find them. In addition, it is stated that “this should not however prevent applicants to a non-flagged topic from including a gender dimension in their proposal if they find it relevant” (EC, 2014). In addition to applicants being asked in their H2020 proposals to describe how sex or gender analysis is taken into account, in the evaluation process evaluators with gender expertise check whether this has been done properly for the flagged topics. The Commission intends to monitor what the status is of the inclusion of gender in the content of research proposals that have been submitted and granted. Finally, gender training can be included in the eligible costs of an action.

The approach taken at the EU level is a model that can and does serve to inspire national and local approaches; it should be continued and strengthened.

When we talk about gender issues and academic research, we tend to concentrate on fixing the numbers and fixing the organisations. To fix the numbers means more women entering research careers, staying in and reaching leadership positions; while to fix the organisations refers to universities and other research organisations making structural changes in the way they recruit, support, retain and promote. This has not been the focus of this article. Instead, we have argued there is a third task when it comes to gender and research, which is fixing the knowledge (Schiebinger and Schraudner, 2011).

To “fix the knowledge” means making sure that research is done on both the male and female sex and gender variants, or for all sexes and genders, when needed and as appropriate. Taking a gender-/sex-sensitive approach in research has the capacity to improve people’s lives, save money, result in gender-equal and better products and services, help to address societal challenges and ultimately to improve society across a broad front. True innovation and robust responses to global problems will not come about if half the population is relatively under-served by existing research. If indeed it is the case that women hold up half the sky, as Mao Zedong has said, then surely “they deserve half the research as well” (quote attributed to Simone Buitendijk, co-author of the LERU paper).

Dr. Katrien Maes, Chief Policy Officer

League of European Research Universities (LERU)

Buitendijk, S., D. Corda, A. Flodström, A. Holdcroft et al. (2011): “Women in science and medicine”, letter to The Lancet, 377(9768).

Buitendijk, S., and K. Maes (2015): Gendered research and innovation: integrating sex and gender analysis into the research process, Leuven: League of European Research Universities.

Dey, S., M. Flather, G. Devlin, D. Brieger et al. (2009): “Sex-related differences in the presentation, treatment, and outcomes among patients with acute coronary syndromes: the global registry of acute coronary events”, Heart, 95(1).

European Commission (2014): Vademecum on gender equality in Horizon 2020, Brussels: European Commission.

Räisänen, U., and K. Hunt (2015): “The role of gendered constructions of eating disorders in delated help-seeking in men: a qualitative interview study”, BMJ Open, 4(4).

Sánchez de Madariaga, I. (2013): “Mobility of care. Introducing new concepts in urban transportation”, in I. Sánchez de Madariaga and M. Roberts (eds.): Fair shared cities: the impact of gender planning in Europe, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Schiebinger, L., and M. Schraudner (2011): “Interdisciplinary approaches to achieving gendered innovations in science, medicine, and engineering”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 36(2).

Has there been a decline in occupational returns associated with educational credentials during the expansion of education that began in Spain in the 1960s? This study uses the concept of the positional value1¹ of educational credentials to explore this possibility. The positional value of a credential is defined by the percentage of individuals that enter the labour market each year with at least that same level of education. The higher this percentage, the lower is the positional value of the credential.

In our research we use the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) to reconstruct the educational and occupational trajectories of Spanish cohorts that entered the labour market during the key period of educational expansion, when primary and secondary education was universalized and access to tertiary education became more widespread.

Our analysis of these trajectories shows that the increase in the percentage of credentials has in effect been associated with a loss in their occupational returns. This loss was greater in the humanities and social sciences, particularly in regards to university degrees. In applied or technical studies, the loss was lower and, in the case of technical university degrees, there has been no loss, probably because such degrees transmit more information about the qualifications of their holders.

The expansion of the education system can be conceived as an increase of the collective effort a society dedicates to education (measured, for example, in percentage of GDP) or simply as the increase in the percentage of individuals that access higher levels of education. In this study we follow the latter, more common, definition (Haim and Shavit, 2013). The expansion in education experienced in many OECD countries since the 1960s generated growing opportunities for social mobility for disadvantaged populations. Although they do not include Spain, the conclusions of recent international studies on social mobility (Breen et al, 2009; Breen et al, 2004) are encouraging regarding the effects of expansion on equality in educational achievement by social origin; that is, on the growing opportunity that the child of a manual worker has of obtaining a university degree in comparison with the child of someone in the liberal professions. Breen et al (2009) concluded that the relative opportunities of one or the other are not completely equal, but that educational expansion has clearly reduced differences.

However, the increase in equality in educational opportunities by social origin may not have had a totally positive effect on social mobility if education has become a positional good; in other words, a good that increasingly depends on the place that certifications occupy in relation to others within a hierarchy. In such a case, by multiplying higher education credentials, they lose a part of their value depending on their location within the educational hierarchy, and social origin could acquire a new effect over occupational returns. It may be that we see the importance of contacts (social capital) or parents' cultural level (cultural capital) return, for example, at the time of a job interview.

In what follows, we will examine whether such concerns have an empirical basis in Spain. The Spanish case is important because there are few other countries that have made such notable efforts expanding education in recent decades. Spain has gone from an illiteracy rate of 50.1% in 1960 to one of 2.5% in 2004, and from an average of approximately 3 years of education among the population over 15 years of age in 1960 to more than 10 years in 2010 (see graph 1).

To examine the concerns we have formulated, we consider two possible values for educational credentials. On the one hand, there is an absolute or intrinsec value: the diploma of a lathe operator confers on the holder the skill necessary to operate a lathe; in the same manner, a doctor or lawyer acquires a specific capacity to carry out the tasks required of their respective jobs. On the other hand, there is a positional value, which depends on how limited certain credentials are in the labour market that are based on the same education level or a higher one. Thus, for example, university degrees would not have the same value if they accounted for 5% or 25% of the total of credentials generated by the education system. With some notable exceptions (Ultee, 1980), positional value and its consequences have not been considered in analyses of social stratification and mobility until very recently (van de Werfhorst, 2011; Bol, 2015).

There are different ways of conceiving the relationship between positional value and the occupational return that educational qualifications guarantee. Human capital theory argues that education has only the intrinsec value we have mentioned: the increase in the percentage of individuals with high levels of education should not imply any disadvantage in terms of the work that those who possess the corresponding educational credentials aspire to.

The theory of credentialism, in contrast, considers it possible that there has been a process of inflating credentials. Individuals do not only acquire human capital for the purpose of gaining skills to carry out concrete occupational tasks, but also to benefit from the rewards that members of the select club of the most highly educated enjoy. This club would no longer be as select if there were more persons holding intermediate and higher level credentials. Individuals would then look to distinguish themselves with further investments in human capital that would result in an inflation of credentials and their consequential devaluation.

According to a variation of the theory of credentialism, the effect of the positional value of education on occupational returns is not the same for all types of education. Iannelli and Raffe (2007) formulated two hypotheses in this regard. The hypothesis of low academic performance postulates that vocational or technical education can be more easily stigmatised (and its results more devalued, especially in secondary education) because individuals access said studies with lower academic results than those who follow a general education path.  In contrast, according to the hypothesis of the diffuse signal, general education can be more vulnerable to an eventual devaluation of credentials because it does not reflect the competencies it confers as well.  The increasing access of individuals to higher levels of education means that the heterogeneity of capacities and skills (and, therefore, of potential productivity) becomes greater. This can be particularly negative for general education credentials, as they are more difficult to evaluate for employers than technical or applied credentials (Klein, 2011; Ganzeboom and Luijkx, 2004). 

To test which of these hypotheses fits reality better, we use data from the European Union Labour Force Survey (EULFS) for the years 2003 and 2004. For these years information is available on education levels and field of studies, as well as the date educational credentials were obtained by participants in the survey. This information makes it possible to precisely reconstruct the trend in the distribution of educational credentials by level of studies for the last decades of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st century in Spain².

Graph 1 illustrates the expansion of education in Spain and that of several other European countries since the 1960s. As can be seen, Spain is the country where the average in years of education for the population over 15 years of age grew the most from 1960 to 2010 (from the lowest to the second highest average). A significant part of this expansion took place in the university system, which grew from 33 to 70 universities in a relatively short period of time (1982-2004) (Cebolla-Boado and others: 93).

To measure occupational returns of educational qualifications, we look at the scores on the ISEI scale given to the last jobs³ held by survey participants after graduating. The ISEI scale (Ganzeboom and others, 1992) is an international indicator of proven validity that ranks occuptions by, among other factors, their level of prestige and pay, both fundamental aspects of what is referred to as socioeconomic status.

The principal objective of our analysis is to estimate the extent to which socioeconomic status is a consequence of the value that an educational credential has, in the two senses discussed previously. To measure the intrinsec and absolute values of educational credentials, we look at four education levels, which correspond to the highest credentials reached by those interviewed: basic secondary education or less (ISCEDO to ISCED2), upper secondary (ISCED3), post-secondary and advanced vocational training (ISCED4 and ISCED5B), and university education (ISCED5A). To measure the positional or relative value of these credentials we look at the percentage of individuals with at least the same level of education as those interviewed in the year in which they left formal education. The higher this percentage, the lower is the positional value of the corresponding education credential.

In addition, we have considered three major fields of study: the first covers studies of a more general character (humanities, social sciences, education, teacher training and services); the second, a good part of technical and scientific studies, including computer sciences, sciences and mathematics; lastly, a third category covers the health sciences.

To reveal the net effect these two values of certifications have on occupational returns, we carried out a multivariate analysis taking into account individual factors (gender, ethnic origin, length of employment, experience/time in the labour market and economic sector of activity) as well as contextual ones (unemployment rate when entering labour market and successive educational reforms that, in general, lengthened the duration of studies) that may also have affected occupational returns. Regarding the contextual factors, we place each respondent in one of nine homogeneous periods in terms of the time when they entered the labour market. 

Graph 2 shows the annual percentage of individuals that entered the Spanish labour market with at least one of the three highest levels of education considered in the study⁴. The graph reflects the same overall trend seen in graph 1 for Spain, but with greater detail, disaggregating the data by levels. The expansion of education logically brought with it an increase in intermediate and higher education certifications, although particularly notable is the increase in upper secondary education. Note that this percentage increase is a reverse reflection of the lose in positional value for each level.

Changes in occupational results for the four education levels analysed between 1960 and 2004, measured by the average socioeconomic status of the occupations holders of educational certifications access for each education level in those years, reveal a slight decline for all the levels, but especially for upper secondary education and university (graph 3). This decline, parallel to the decline in positional value provoked by the expansion of education reflected in graph 2, is an initial indicator of a possible devaluation of educational credentials, understood as the loss of capacity to guarantee to graduates of the education system access to the same jobs as those who graduated before them.

It remains to be seen if the relationship between the loss in positional value and the loss in occupational results that can be seen in graphs 2 and 3 hides the effect of any of the individual variables (gender, ethnic origin, etc.) or contextual variables (time periods) that we referred to above. In addition to confirming that education level is associated with occupational results, the multivariate analysis (coefficients not shown here) reveals a significant statistical association between the loss of positional values of educational credentials and the decline in occupational results they generate. This supports the argument that the expansion of education has caused a devaluation of educational credentials.

For the period from 1965 to 2009, graph 4 shows the changes in occupational results for the credentials granted for the three major fields of study as a consequence of a loss in their positional value, for each education level and controlling for other factors. Values above zero indicate that occupational results improved with the increase in credentials at each level; values below zero indicate that they worsened.

As can be seen, regarding certifications for the three higher levels, an increase of 1% in the percentage of persons with at least the same level of education as the respondent had a small but significant effect on occupational results for the holders of these certifications.

However, this loss was not the same for all the levels nor all types of education. For general studies (the blue line in graph 4), the effect was systematically greater than for technical studies, including the health sciences. In addition, the loss of occupational results for general education was greater at higher education levels, perhaps because, as the hypothesis of "low academic results" argues, in intermediate education levels the employment prospects for holders of the corresponding certifications were not affected by the poor academic performance of persons in those fields, as would have occurred, for example, in vocational training. Thus, at the intermediate level, the advantage of technical education over general education would be less.

In contrast to the trend found for general studies, we see a remarkable immunity to a loss in positional value for certifications in technical-scientific studies, which were barely affected by the greater access of the population to these qualifications or to other higher ones (green line). The advantage in comparison to general studies is particularly noticeable at the level of university education, possibly because technical studies transmit a much clearer signal of the competencies of those holding such qualifications. This interpretation is more plausible if we neutralize, via consideration of the economic sector and period of entry into the labour market, the effect that cyclical variations in the demand for persons with technical qualifications can have on the occupational results of these certifications.

Regarding the results for the health sciences, there is no reason to think that the competencies indicated by a degree in medicine could be less precise than those indicated by a certification in any other technical career. However, the decline in occupational results in terms of a loss in the  positional value of these certifications was significant at the level of university education.

There are two possible explanations for this: One is an institutional explanation specific to the Spanish case. In Spain, certain occupations, historically associated with the liberal professions, managed to impose strong regulations restricting access, for example, through the obligatory use of professional training that can only carried out through examinations (such is the case of medical residents who want to acquire a specialization). This has had a positive effect on the occupational results for particular university degrees. However, if the regulation of access to these professions were stricter than the regulation of access to university studies, this could have produced bottlenecks and a subsequent decline in occupational results with respect to other technical studies. Certain journalistic accounts and some academic evidence point in this direction in the Spanish case (Casquero and others, 2007).

An alternative to this institutional explanation is that the results we have found could be due to the fact that the data source chosen (EUFLS) combines strictly health-related studies (medicine, nursing) with others that are more related to social services (social work), which fit better with the general studies profile considered here.

Is the massive access of the Spanish population to intermediate and higher education related to the devaluation of educational credentials, that is, to losses in their socioeconomic prestige in the labour market? None of the theoretical relations between positional value and the occupational results of an occupation that we have considered have been clearly corroborated by our results. Regarding technical studies, only intrinsic value seems to be important, in line with what human capital theory argues.  In contrast, positional value has been shown to be relevant for more general studies and for studies in the health field, as expected by the theory of credentialism. In both cases, there was a loss of socioeconomic prestige in Spain between 1960 and 2004, which is proportional to the loss in positional value of university degrees in general studies as well as in credentials from secondary education.

This loss fits with a certain decline in the results from educational certifications currently being discussed, and which diverse international bodies have warned about (see here, here and here). For the year 2005 (one year after the period analysed here), the following graph shows the importance of unemployment and underemployment among the population with a tertiary education from 15 to 64 years of age. As can be seen, Spain is one of the countries with the highest percentage of persons with tertiary education without work or with work that does not correspond to their education level (underemployment). Although other countries have also undergone a similar expansion of education, they have not suffered the same levels of underemployment or over-education, so that this phenomenon must, to a certain extent, be attributed to the high rate of temporary employment in the Spanish labour market, which fosters growth in low-productivity sectors and does not create a favourable climate for investment in human capital (Felgueroso and others, 2015).

Regarding social mobility, our findings raise the question of whether the loss in the occupational results of education is evenly distributed by social origin. If it is not, the devaluation of higher education credentials may have strengthened the impact of social origin on social inequalities, assisting certain holders of credentials (those from higher social classes, with greater cultural and social capital) to extract greater occupational results from their educational credentials than others.

Our findings also have practical implications. More open access to higher education levels does not by itself seem to have guaranteed greater equality of opportunities to rise in the social hierarchy, especially for those with more general educational qualifications. To increase the effective equality of opportunities, redistributive policies that make it possible for good students from more disadvantaged backgrounds to compete in equal conditions with their peers must be combined with policies based on improving the information students have regarding the employment outcomes of the certifications they seek and the design of more effective systems to assist students in choosing more profitable educational itineraries.

[1] The positional value of an educational level decreases to the extent that the percentage of individuals that enter the labour market with that level increases. The higher that percentage is, the lower is the positional value of the educational credential.

[2] As we will see, the trend in educational expansion has not changed since 2004. The use of data from those years is a question of convenience, but also of a desire to control for the effects of economic cycles, given that the current one has still not ended.

[3] It would make more sense to look at the scores on the ISEI for the first jobs held by respondents after graduating, but this information is not available in the surveys analysed. However, a recent analysis by Bukody and Robert (2007) shows that the correlation between first job and last is high. We have also found this to be the case with data from the 2006 CIS survey on Class and Social Structure (Ortiz and Rodriguez, 2015). 

[4] Primary level does not appear in the graph because, logically, the percentage of persons entering the labour market with at least this level of education remained constant (100%) during  this period.

Luis Ortiz, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political and Social Sciences

Jorge Rodríguez Menés, Associate Professor, Dept. of Political and Social Sciences

Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona

BARRO, R and LEE, J.W., (2013) 'A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010'Journal of Development Economics 104: 184-198.

BOL, T. (2015) ‘Has education become more positional? Educational expansion and labour market outcomes, 1985-2007’, Acta Sociologica, 58: 105-120.

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BREEN, R., LUIJKX, R., MÜLLER, W. and POLLAK, R. (2009) ‘Nonpersistent Inequality in Educational Attainment: Evidence from Eight European Countries’, American Journal of Sociology, 114(5): pages. 1475-1521.

BUKODI,E., and RÓBERT,P. (2007) Occupational Mobility in Europe. Dublin: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions.

CEBOLLA-BOADO, H., RADL, J. and SALÁZAR, L. (2014) ‘Aprendizaje y ciclo vital. La desigualdad de oportunidades desde la educación preescolar hasta la edad adulta’. Barcelona: Fundación La Caixa (Colección Estudios Sociales, Nº 39)

CASQUERO TOMÁS, A.,GARCÍA CRESPO, D. and NAVARRO GÓMEZ, Mª L. (2007) ‘Inserción laboral y especialización educativa en España’, XVI Jornadas de la Asociación de Economía de la Educación.

FELGUEROSO, F., HIDALGO-PÉREZ, M. and JIMÉNEZ-MARTÍN, S. (2015) ‘The Puzzling Fall of the Wage Skill Premium in Spain’, The Manchester School,doi: 10.1111/manc.12116

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The grants programme of the “la Caixa” Banking Foundation, which funds postgraduate studies, has been seen to have a major impact on the careers of beneficiaries, such as better working conditions and greater social and scientific relevance in their work. However, what circumstances condition which people apply for grants and which people obtain them?

In both cases, the determining factor is the academic excellence of the university students involved. However, when the academic records involved are similar, components such as gender and socioeconomic status also come into play. Women, and candidates from more disadvantaged families, are less likely to apply for these grants and, when they do apply, have fewer probabilities of obtaining them.

To identify the most relevant factors involved in making the decision to apply for a grant from the Foundation, as well as elements that help determine to whom grants are awarded, data were analysed from 15 grant calls published between the years 2014 and 2018 and corresponding to three different programmes based on destination (Spain, Europe or America-Asia). Furthermore, for analysis of the relevant factors in grant applications, data from the programme, which had nearly 10,000 applicants, were combined with information on nearly 57,000 students from the Universitat de Barcelona (UB) who obtained a qualification between 2009 and 2017. These data provided knowledge regarding the level of education of students’ parents, and that information was used for an approximation of the socioeconomic status of students’ families.

Comparison with the general data on UB qualification-holders enables the most relevant characteristics of grant applicants to be established: if all graduates are considered, the general application rate is 0.76%. Among those students whose academic records are among the 25% with the highest qualifications (TOP-25), the application rate increases to 1.22% and, for the best 10% of their year (TOP-10), it increases to 1.70%.

It is thus observed that, among university graduates with the best academic records, the rate of applications doubles that of the whole group of students, a situation that reflects the Foundation’s main goal: rewarding academic excellence. However, it is also clearly appreciated that this TOP-10 group is influenced by gender and by socioeconomic status as previously noted. Men have an application rate of 2.6%, while women barely reach 1.2%. Furthermore, the rate of applications from students with two university-educated parents (2.6%) doubles that of students whose parents did not complete higher education.

If academic excellence is the main factor that explains which students apply for “la Caixa” postgraduate grants, it also constitutes the main determinant for success in obtaining them. Among the total of applicants, the global rate of success in obtaining grants is situated at 9%, but the most brilliant students have a much greater efficacy. Among the TOP-25, applications that prosper reach 30%, while among the TOP-10 are now 45.2% of the students who manage to obtain grants.

As a complementary detail, the university of origin also plays an important role with regard to passing the selection process, consisting of a remote evaluation and a personal interview. It has been confirmed that, all other characteristics being equal, students from the universities best positioned in the international rankings have a success rate 2.4 percentage points higher than the rest.

Both gender and socioeconomic status influence the probability of becoming a grant beneficiary. For the overall set of applicants, women give success rates 3 percentage points (p.p.) lower than men. These differences are maintained, although attenuated by 1 p.p., when taking into account the average grade and the university of origin.

With regard to socioeconomic status, candidates with a higher status benefit from a success differential that is 2.4 p.p. higher in the case of men and 1.5 p.p. in that of women.

In the percentages of grant awards, the gender gap and socioeconomic status are explained, in part, because women and students from less favoured environments tend to prefer programmes of greater geographical proximity. Thus, although women represent 41.7% of the applicants for the set of the 3 programmes, they account for only 32.8% in the America-Asia programme versus 44.3%, and 42.6% in the programmes of Europe and Spain respectively.  A preference is also observed for programmes at closer locations among applicants with a low socioeconomic status: while they represent practically half of applications in the programmes of America-Asia and Europe, their weight increases up to nearly 60% in the case of the PhD programme in Spain.

This article has been adapted based on the study:

Lídia Farré (Universitat de Barcelona), Francesc Ortega (City University of New York):  Becas de “la Caixa”: ¿Quiénes las solicitan? ¿Quiénes las obtienen? Evaluación de los factores socioeconómicos, académicos y personales que influyen en la decisión de solicitar una beca y en la probabilidad de obtenerla. 

Other bibliographical references:

GARCÍA-MONTALVO, J. (2014): Impacto de las becas “la Caixa” de posgrado en el extranjero.

From primary through secondary school, immigrant children obtain worse results in school than native children. Their lower performance may be due to the fact that they come from families with fewer financial and educational resources, and that they have less knowledge of the language of the receiving country and its education system. Attending preschool has been found to reduce performance differences in school between children from disadvantaged and advantaged families. This article looks at whether preschool participation has a positive effect on reading skills in primary and secondary school and whether it has helped to reduce the reading gap found among immigrant children in Spain, Norway and Sweden.

The findings indicate that both native and immigrant children benefit from preschool attendance in all three countries; the benefit to immigrants is however greater in Norway and Sweden than in Spain. Two conclusions can be drawn: First, given that a lower proportion of  children of immigrant background participate in preschool, states should encourage their attendance to reduce their reading disadvantages. Secondly, as immigrant children in particular seem to benefit from lower child-staff ratios and longer weekly preschool attendance, Spain might further reduce social inequalities by improving these aspects of preschool education.

In this article we examine the effect of attending preschool on children's reading skills in primary and secondary school and, specifically, on immigrant children (i.e. children with at least one parent born outside the country). In addition, in order to assess whether the beneficial effect of preschool attendance varies across different preschool systems, we compare Spain with two countries considered to have excellent preschool systems, namely Norway and Sweden.

The issue of the beneficial effect of preschool attendance on reading skills is of particular importance, as reading skills are a basic prerequisite for educational and labour market success. Increasing students' reading skills contributes both to individual and national well-being (Rindermann and Ceci 2009). Moreover, reducing differences in skills between native and immigrant children can help to reduce social inequalities within countries and facilitate immigrants’ integration in society (Magnuson et al., 2006).

Thus, if preschool attendance has beneficial effects on reading skills, particularly for immigrant children, expanding attendance can help in achieving those goals. In addition, if the benefits of preschool vary with different preschool systems, improving certain characteristics of a country's preschool system might further contribute to both the overall well-being of society and to that of its immigrant population.

Two international assessment tests of students' knowledge are used to examine these issues: the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) and the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). Data from these tests provide comparative information about the reading skills of children in primary school at around age 10 (PIRLS) and in secondary school at around age 15 (PISA); moreover, they offer retrospective information on preschool attendance. 

Particularly since the first PISA evaluation in 2000, the question of why immigrant children have lower reading skills than native children has attracted a lot of interest among policy-makers and in research. Immigrant children already perform worse than native children in primary school, and these disadvantages grow during secondary school. However, while this is true for the overall immigrant population, there are differences by country of origin.

Graph 1 shows the reading skills of students of immigrant and native origin in primary and secondary school in Spain, Sweden and Norway. In primary school (left panel), immigrant children in Spain score 13 test points lower than native students, which is equivalent to approximately 4 months of schooling (the progress made in one school year amounts to approximately 40 test score points; see Strietholt, Rosen and Bos, 2012; OECD 2014). In Sweden and Norway, differences in reading skills between native and immigrant pupils are even higher, with immigrant children lagging around 5 months behind.

This disadvantage increases in secondary school (right panel), where reading skills of immigrant children are about 8 months of schooling behind in Spain and 9 in Sweden. Immigrants in Norway face the lowest disadvantage, which however still amounts to 21 test points or approximately 6 months of schooling.

Immigrant students' disadvantages are often considered to be the result of coming from families with fewer financial and educational resources. Parents in such families tend to have less knowledge about the education system and may not speak the language of the receiving country well. Also related is the fact that immigrant children often speak the language of their origin at home; this affects their acquisition of the language of their new country of residence (Magnuson et al., 2006).

In preschool, immigrant children enter into contact with native children and children from different socioeconomic backgrounds as well as teaching professionals.  In general investments in children’s development – such as preschool attendance – have the potential to increase their cognitive skills over the length of their lives (Heckman 2006) and could compensate for or at least partially reduce an initial worse starting position.

However, despite the positive impact of preschool attendance on immigrant children's reading skills, they have, until now, been less likely to attend preschool than native children (Vesely and Ginsberg, 2011).

In addition, not all preschool education is of the same quality: the benefit for children from disadvantaged socioeconomic backgrounds is higher in countries with high quality preschools (Esping-Andersen et al., 2012) and longer preschool days (Zvoch, Reynolds and Parker, 2008). 

Preschool systems can be divided into two stages:  the first for children aged 0 to 3 years of age and the second for children from 3 to 6 years of age. Their characteristics vary according to factors such as the number of children per classroom, teachers' qualifications and the weekly hours of attendance.

A lower proportion of children attend preschool in the first cycle (from 0 to 3 years of age) in Spain and Norway than in Sweden: 52% in Sweden in comparison  to 39%  in Spain and 34% in Norway (table 1).  In addition, the weekly hours of attendance are shorter in Spain, with only 36% of children in the first cycle attending preschool for 30 or more weekly hours, compared to 67% in Norway and 58% in Sweden. Regarding student-teacher ratio, Spain (with 16 children per teacher) lags far behind Norway (8 children) and Sweden (5-6 children). In Sweden, teachers with tertiary education (a university degree) predominate; in Spain and Norway, the educational qualifications of the teaching staff vary more, with teachers holding both university and non-university qualifications.

In the second cycle of preschool education for children aged 3 to compulsory school age, all three countries have high attendance, approximately 90% in Spain and Sweden and 80% in Norway. The percentage of preschool children in this age group attending preschool 30 or more hours per week is again lower in Spain, 43% in comparison with the two Nordic countries, both with more than 60%. Similar to the first cycle of preschool education, Spain has a much higher child-teacher ratio (above 20 children per teacher) than Norway and Sweden.

Finally, it should be noted that special language programmes for children who do not speak the native language at home exist in all three countries in both cycles of preschool when there are a notably high number of children of immigrant origin in the classroom. Furthermore, in Norway and Sweden, the option of employing support teachers also exists.

Altogether, Spain’s preschool system lags behind those of Norway and Sweden because of shorter weekly hours of attendance and a higher child-teacher ratio. 

Do the gains from preschool attendance vary among the three countries, given the differences in their preschool systems? An answer to this question is provided by examining the reading test scores of primary and secondary school children by preschool experience.

Immigrant children in all three countries are less likely to participate in early preschool: in Spain 63% of native children but only 53% of immigrant children attend the first cycle of preschool, while in Norway and Sweden 65% of native children do so and 58% of immigrant children in Norway and 54% in Sweden. Regarding preschool attendance during the second cycle (for children aged 3 to compulsory school age), Spain reveals the most pronounced differences among native and immigrant children (89% of natives and only 74% of immigrants have attended preschool). In Norway and Sweden attendance rates for native children are 89% and 75%, respectively, while they are 79% and 65% for immigrant children.

Apart from preschool attendance and being of native or immigrant origin, another important factor in explaining reading skills in primary and secondary school is family socioeconomic background. However, this factor is also related to preschool attendance: Children from more advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds are more likely to attend preschool than children from disadvantaged ones. For example, in Spain 73% of children with parents with high levels of education attend preschool for three years or longer, while only 48% of children with parents with low levels of education do so. In Norway and Sweden these same proportions are, respectively, 75% and 72% for children with parents with high levels of education, and only 33% and 38% for children with parents with low levels of education.

As a consequence, the results obtained must be qualified, taking into account the socioeconomic background of families, otherwise our results regarding the relationship between preschool attendance and reading skills would also partly reflect the influence of socioeconomic background on children's capacities.

Thus, the analysis considers the weight of other factors that are likely to shape reading skills, such as students’ age, gender, their grade in school,  characteristics related to their parents’ employment and pedagogical involvement, and whether they live with both parents. With multivariate analyses we can remove the influence of socioeconomic background and these other factors to see the ‘pure’ or net effect of preschool experience.

The left panel of graph 2 shows that children in Spain that attended preschool for three years or more scored 19 points higher on test scores in primary school than children without that experience, while  in Sweden and Norway their test scores were 18 points higher (corresponding to approximately 6 and 5 months in school). Hence, reading gains in primary school from attending preschool are quite similar in all three countries.

The right panel in the graph indicates that the difference in reading skills in secondary school between children who attended preschool for more than one year and those who did not is highest in Spain. There, the competence gain for one year or more of preschool attendance amounts to 36 points, which corresponds to the progress made in approximately 11 months of schooling. In Norway and Sweden, preschool participation raises test scores by 30 and 34 points, respectively.

In short, the results show that children in Spain also benefit from preschool attendance, although the preschool systems in Norway and Sweden have lower child-staff ratios and longer weekly hours of participation.

Are the benefits of preschool education (as measured in improved reading comprehension) the same for all students, or are there differences between native and immigrant children? To answer this question, we look at the results of our analysis of reading skills of native and immigrant children in primary and secondary school for the three countries studied (graphs 3 and 4). The results, again, show the net effect after adjusting for the possible influence of other important  factors already mentioned related to the family sphere.

Graph 3 presents the average reading skills in primary school for native children and immigrant children, depending on whether they attended preschool for less or more than three years.  In all three countries, native children obtain better scores than immigrant children, regardless of the length of time spent in preschool. Attending preschool for three or more years visibly improves scores for both groups of children. However, we see that immigrant children benefit more from attending preschool than native children: In Spain, for example, the gain from preschool participation amounts to 26 test points for immigrant children, while it is 17 points for native children. Thus, preschool in Spain reduces the separation between the two groups from 19 points to only 9 points (approximately 3 months of schooling). In Norway and Sweden, attending preschool is even more beneficial for immigrant children, reducing the differences in test scores between native and immigrant children even more than in Spain. 

The results for reading test score gains in secondary school (graph 4) for Spain are somewhat different: the benefit from having participated in preschool one year or longer is only slightly higher for immigrants than for native students; the difference of 4 test points corresponds to a  gain of only approximately 1 month of schooling. Although the average scores obtained by native students continue to be higher than those of immigrant students, among both those who attended preschool and those who did not, the gains obtained by immigrant students from attending preschool are greater than those obtained by native students.

In turn, in both Norway and Sweden the gain from having participated in preschool for one year or more is notably greater for immigrant children  than native children: in Norway, the difference in the gain between native children and immigrant children is 29 test points (approximately 9 months of schooling), while in Sweden it is 18 points (approximately 5 months).

In short, in all three countries, longer preschool attendance reduces the disadvantages of immigrant children compared to native children. However, this pattern is more pronounced in the Nordic countries than in Spain, and this is true regarding reading skills in both primary and secondary school. Although the causes may be complex, the greater benefit obtained from preschool attendance among immigrant children in Norway and Sweden might be due to the lower child-teacher ratio, and the existence of complementary programmes specifically designed for immigrant children and which allow teachers to dedicate more time to each child and plan activities adequate to a student body with diverse characteristics.

Regarding the language deficits of children of immigrant background in particular, this greater dedication of time might influence reading performance in primary and secondary school. Longer weekly hours of preschool attendance may also have a similar impact, increasing the time immigrant children are exposed to a learning environment that offers them greater stimuli than they may receive at home.

Two main conclusions can be drawn from this article. First, the findings show that children who attend preschool achieve higher reading test scores in primary and secondary school than their peers who do not, and that, although native children score higher than immigrant children, the benefits of preschool are greater for immigrant children than for native children in all three countries examined.

As a lower proportion of immigrant children attend preschool than native children, expanding the preschool attendance of immigrant children might help to decrease the gap in reading skills between native and immigrant children found in primary and secondary school. Preschool attendance might therefore help immigrant children  improve their school performance and their language skills and, consequently, also improve their later integration into the labour market.

Secondly, immigrant children (compared to natives) seem to benefit more from preschool attendance in Norway and Sweden than in Spain. One possible reason for the lower gains of immigrant children compared to native children in Spain might be the shorter weekly hours of preschool attendance and the higher child-staff ratio. For children aged 3 to compulsory school age, one teacher cares for more than 20 children in Spain. Immigrant children may have a higher need for individual attention from the teacher or more time in a homogeneous and language-stimulating environment to compensate for disadvantages related to language acquisition and socioeconomic background. 

Johanna Dämmrich

European University Institute

Esping-Andersen, G., I. Garfinkel, W.J. Han, K. Magnuson, S. Wagner and J. Waldfogel (2012): «Child care and school performance in Denmark and the United States», Children and Youth Services Review, 34.

Eurydice (2009): Tackling social and?cultural inequalities through? early childhood education and care in Europe, Brussels: European Commision.

Heckman, J.J. (2006): «Skill formation and the economics of investing in disadvantaged children», Science, 312.

Kluczniok, K., and H.-G. Roßbach (2014): «Conceptions of educational quality for kindergartens», ZeitschriftfürErziehungswissenschaft, 17(S6).

Levels, M., and J. Dronkers (2008): «Educational performance of native and immigrant children from various countries of origin», Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(8).

Magnuson, K., C. Lahaie and J. Waldfogel (2006): «Preschool and school readiness of children of immigrants», Social Science Quarterly, 87(5).

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2015): Starting strong II: Early childhood education and care. [http://www.oecd.org/edu/school/startingstrongiiearlychildhoodeducationandcare.htm].

— (2014): PISA 2012 Results in Focus: What 15-year-olds know and what they can do with what they know, Paris: OECD.

Rindermann, H., and S.J. Ceci (2009): «Perspectives on psychological science educational policy and country outcomes in international cognitive competence studies», Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4.

Strietholt, R., M. Rosén and W. Bos (2013): «A correction model for differences in the sample compositions: the degree of comparability as a function of age and schooling», Large-scale Assessments in Education, 1(1).

Vesely, C.K., and M.R. Ginsberg (2011): Exploration of the status of services for immigrant families in early childhood education programs, Washington: National Association for the Education of Young Children.

Zvoch, K., R.E. Reynolds and R.P. Parker (2008): «Full-day kindergarten and student literacy growth: does a lengthened school day make a difference?», Early Childhood Research Quarterly, 23(1).

A significant difference still exists in Spain between the productive activity of men and women. While men devote the larger part of their active life to paid work, women spend more time caring for children and elderly dependents, as well as running the household. This study presents the profiles by age, of consumption and paid and unpaid production differentiated by sex. The results clearly manifest the importance of care tasks and unpaid activities for people’s wellbeing, along with the need to rethink the system of public and social policies with the aim of reducing the costs of reconciling family life with work. This need is evident in the case of women, who, when they are mothers, see a considerable increase in their total working hours and, in many cases, are excluded from the protection represented by being in paid employment.

Men and women work inside and outside of the labour market with different intensity. While men devote the large part of their active life to paid jobs in the market, women spend more time caring for children and elderly dependents and running the household: all unpaid activities. Although it is true that the situation has changed considerably in recent decades and increasing numbers of women have been entering paid employment outside of the household, the gap in Spain with respect to time spent on household domestic tasks by men and women continues to be one of the largest in Europe. This pattern has an impact on everyone’s wellbeing.

Moreover, depending on age we have different needs, which make transfers of resources necessary between individuals of different ages. Thus, for example, during childhood and old age, individuals do not have the capacity to produce the resources to cover their needs and so require transfers (of money as well as of attention and care) from other age groups. These transfers can be articulated in various ways: through the family, the public sector, or the market itself, especially in the case of elderly people, who may save as they work in order to consume at a later stage.

In this study we analyse the flows of resources (monetary and non-monetary) taking place in society and we take into account two perspectives: age and gender. For this, we construct profiles by age of consumption and production in Spain, both for paid and unpaid activities, and for men and women separately. The results reveal important gender-based differences since unpaid work, such as looking after the house and taking care of relatives, is mainly carried out by adult women; in contrast, the presence of men is higher in paid productive activities. Also, the productive profile by age is also different for men and women: men enter the labour market earlier (and with higher pay) and leave it later, while women participate earlier and for a longer time in domestic production. Consequently, we conclude that a concept of economic dependency that only contemplates the monetary factor is clearly incomplete, as it does not consider the rest of the productive activities undertaken mainly by women.

As we have pointed out, over the course of the life cycle, people go through different life phases with diverse needs. Thus, although they need to consume and satisfy their needs over their entire life course, it is only while they are of working age that they have the capacity to generate monetary resources. For this reason transfers of resources take place between individuals of different ages (inter-generational transfers). The size and composition of these transfers determine, to a large extent, the wellbeing of people and of society in general. 

The National Transfer Accounts (NTA) methodology allows profiles of different economic variables (consumption, market production, public and private transfers given and received, among others) to be constructed by age in a way that is consistent with the National Accounts. Graph 1 presents the profile by age of consumption and the average labour income per capita of a set of countries from the NTA project representing different regions of the world. By labour income we mean any remuneration received as a salaried or self-employed worker, while consumption reflects the monetary value of all the goods and services consumed, both public and private. 

Over the course of the life cycle, two perfectly differentiated phases can be observed where what is known as the Life Cycle Deficit (LCD) occurs, i.e., phases where consumption exceeds labour income. This occurs from birth up to the age of 24 years and from the age of 59 years onwards. In contrast, between 25 and 58 years of age, the situation is one of surplus (labour income exceeds consumption). Thus, mechanisms have to exist that allow transfers of resources from ages with a surplus to individuals with a deficit. These are basically three: 1) private transfers that arise basically within the family sphere, such as from parents to children to cover their different needs (housing, food, etc.); 2) public transfers made by the State, for example, by providing services such as health, education or pensions for citizens and that it finances through the collection of taxes and social security contributions; 3) individuals can also resort to the assets markets to redistribute their labour income over the course of their life cycle. Thus, for example, individuals can save and accumulate assets during the surplus phase to use them at a later stage during old age, or alternatively take out loans to attend to their current consumption needs and pay them back subsequently.

The data used to estimate the NTAs in the case of Spain come mainly from two household surveys: the Survey on Living Conditions and the Survey on Family Budgets. The information contained in these – complemented with information on public provisions – makes it possible to construct profiles by age of consumption and labour income (similar to those shown in Graph 1), as well as other measurements such as public monetary transfers and private monetary transfers that take place between the members of a single household and between different households. These profiles are adapted to the aggregates of the National Accounts in such a way as to be consistent with them (Lee and Mason, 2011).

In addition to monetary transfers, individuals also depend on other resources that may not be provided through the market, and therefore, are unpaid. This is the case of housework, childcare and looking after ill or elderly people, as well as different volunteering tasks. These kinds of activities are largely carried out by women, but since they are not provided via the market, they are unpaid and for this reason they do not appear as accounted for in the National Accounts. With the aim of including them in the analysis and raising the visibility of women’s real contribution to the economy, this study expands the NTA method to incorporate activities not registered in the market, in other words, household domestic production. This methodological extension, called National Time Transfer Accounts, NTTA), has been developed within the context of the project Counting Women’s Work (CWW). For this, we use the Survey on the Use of Time (Encuesta sobre el Empleo del Tiempo, EET), produced by the INE (Spanish Statistics Institute) in 2009-2010. In this survey, through the use of diaries, each interviewee records the tasks carried out during the day. Thanks to these types of surveys, there has been a significant increase in studies on unpaid productive activities (Folbre, 2004).

Unpaid household domestic work, despite its social and economic importance, is not included in the National Accounting. The National Accounts System (Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales), which establishes common standards for the calculation of the national income, considers as productive activities only those carried out through transactions in markets, thus excluding other sources of resources that are very relevant with regard to their contribution to individual and social wellbeing, such as household domestic activities and the attention and care of children and dependent persons. In consequence, the value of the total production of the economy is underestimated, particularly the value of the production contributed by women, who are mainly responsible for the unpaid part (Waring, 1999).

However, accounting for unpaid production is not simple. Firstly, it is important to determine which unpaid activities are productive, In our study we use the “third person” criterion, which identifies as a productive activity one that can be carried out by a third person and, therefore, could be managed via the market. Thus, for example, eating is not a productive activity, as nobody else can do it for us; however, cooking is a productive activity, because it would be possible to hire a cook or alternatively pay to eat at a restaurant. Subsequently, once the number of unpaid hours of production has been estimated, they are assigned a monetary value with the aim of making them comparable to paid activities. Our results take the market salary of domestic services professions (replacement cost criterion) which may be very much lower than the salary paid to the person carrying out the work (opportunity cost criterion).

The EET allows us to construct a profile by age of hours devoted to paid (labour market) and unpaid (household work) production according to age and sex, as shown in Graph 2. In it we observe that up to the age of 18-20 years approximately, young people devote the largest part of the time to education, and that gender differences are not highly relevant. In adult age, men and women devote their time to productive activities. Clearly, men concentrate on paid activities while women devote less time to working in the market and more than double the time that men devote to domestic production. It is worth highlighting that, once the age of retirement is reached, paid production disappears in both men and women alike, while domestic production, although it declines in both cases, continues to be much higher in the case of women.

If all types of activities (paid and unpaid) are taken into account, Spanish women aged between 21 and 65 years work on average 1.1 hours more per day than men. This result is not repeated in other countries in Europe, where men and women work a similar number of hours in total, although women are also more specialised in unpaid activities (Hammer et al., 2015). This inequality could be one of the consequences of the lack of development in Spain of public provisions for childcare services and long-term care for people in a situation of dependency. The country has experienced a rapid and important change towards a dual income economic model, where both members of the couple work full days – the employment rate for women increased from 34.5% in 1992 to 53.8% in 2013. However, female labour income is significantly reduced by having children, and this is due above all to their withdrawal from the labour market, with temporary interruption being less frequent (Anxo et al., 2007). This fact leads to the precarious status of women as workers outside of the market, lacking protection and regulation (Durán, 2010).

Graph 3 shows the results of our estimates of the total value of men’s and women’s production. As can be observed, major inequalities exist: while men are responsible for 61% of market production, women carry out 67% of domestic production. We confirm that the increase in access to the labour market for women does not necessarily imply gender equality in the household, unless there is culmination of the process of cultural change accompanied by an effort to balance care for the family through public policies. 

Thus, in Spain, the Southern Europe welfare state model predominates, which Saraceno (1994) called “familyism without support”, characterised by a low level of public services to attend to small children and elderly dependents. This is closely related with greater differentials of time observed between men and women in the sphere of household domestic work. In other European countries with better policies for supporting the reconciliation of work and family time, women have a higher participation in the labour market and the possibility of adjusting their family time and their productive time, domestic and market alike. 

The Life Cycle Deficit (LCD) or difference between consumption and labour income for each age considered by the NTA project does not include activities outside of the market (the services and care received, mainly, from other family members). When introducing these types of unpaid activities, the domestic LCD can be defined as the difference between the consumption of domestic services and their production at each age. Both profiles are shown compared in Graph 4 for men and women in Spain. Note that in the case of the unpaid LCD, the surplus (deficit) is automatically converted into transfers given (received). 

The profile of the market LCD shows that men start to build up their surplus at slightly earlier ages, which indicates that they enter the labour market earlier and with higher salaries. Meanwhile, in the unpaid LCD, it is women who present a surplus at earlier ages, which is indicative that they provide more care and domestic services than they receive from earlier ages than men (22 years against 28 years). However, due, in part, to the wage of domestic workers used to give a monetary value to these unpaid activities being very low, the market activities of men amply exceed the level of surplus with respect to the activities of women. At advanced ages, it is observed that men start to consume more than they produce in the market at the age of 62 years, whereas the deficit for women starts at the age of 54 years. But again, the contrary occurs with the unpaid LCD: men start to present a deficit at the age of 49 years, whereas women continue providing more services and care than they receive up to and beyond the age of 80 years. 

The graph also shows two especially important results. Firstly, as one would expect, those who consume most domestic activities, and therefore receive most transfers of time, are children, and this need is greater the younger their age. In fact, the value of the care received during the early stages of life is higher than the monetary resources necessary to cover material needs. Meanwhile, adult women are net donators of domestic work and care during practically their entire adult life and up to very advanced ages, whereas men become net receivers before the age of 50 years. Men only present a surplus in their unpaid LCD coinciding with the ages (30-50 years) in which commonly they are parents of young children, which is confirmed when we separate unpaid activities between household activities and care of other family members, since then it can be observed that the majority of the domestic production time of men is concentrated on the care of their children.

Although it is difficult to measure individual and social economic wellbeing, it is indisputable that what needs to be taken into account, in addition to level of monetary income, is production outside of the market (household work, care of children and of elderly or dependent persons). If we conclude that this unpaid production is carried out fundamentally by women, a correct analysis would lead us to a new definition of economic dependency beyond purely monetary considerations.

This study shows profiles by age of consumption and of paid and unpaid production, differentiated by gender. The estimates refer to the year 2009-2010 in Spain, as this is the last year for which data from the Survey on the Use of Time (EET) undertaken by the INE are available. This type of analysis is crucial for heightening visibility of the role of women not only as workers in the market, but also in the unpaid work that makes a vital contribution to social wellbeing.

Our results show that women are net donators of unpaid resources (household work and care) to other age groups over the entire course of their adult life. Men, in contrast, are only net donators of these types of resources between the ages of 30 and 50 years, when they are mainly devoted to caring for their children.

However, if the results are considered as a snapshot of the situation observed in 2009-2010, the differentiated patterns between young and older men and women also reflect a change in behaviour between the younger generations in relation with those born over 50 years ago. Moreover, the data refer to a year just at the start of the economic crisis, and we know little about how the crisis has influenced gender roles through changes in productive patterns and the new configuration of public and private transfers.

Our study highlights the importance of care and unpaid activities for people’s wellbeing, as well as the need to rethink the system of public and social policies with the aim of reducing the costs of reconciling work and family time. This need is evident in the case of women when they are mothers, as they increase the total number of work hours in a very unequal way with respect to men, and in many cases they are excluded from the protection represented by being in paid employment. 

Elisenda Rentería (University of Barcelona (UB) researcher)
Rosario Scandurra (University of Barcelona (UB) researcher)
Guadalupe Souto (Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) researcher)
Concepció Patxot (University of Barcelona (UB) researcher)

Anxo, D., L. Flood, L. Mencarini, A. Pailh, A. Solaz and M.L. Tanturri (2007): «Gender differences in time use over the life course in France, Italy, Sweden, and the US», Feminist Economics, 17(3).

Counting Women’s Work

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Folbre, N. (2004): Family time: the social organization of care, New York: Routledge.

Hammer, B., A. Prskawetz and I. Freund (2015): «Production activities and economic dependency by age and gender in Europe: a cross-country comparison», The Journal of the Economics of Ageing, 5 [DOI: 10.1016/j.jeoa.2014.09.007].

Lee, R., and A. Mason (2011): Population aging and the generational economy: a global perspective, Northampton: Edward Elgar.

National Transfer Accounts

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This article studies the relevance of social background in finding quality employment at two key moments: before and during the economic crisis. In countries such as Spain, Italy or Poland, belonging to a family with a good social position is important for finding good employment, independently of the training received. The results indicate that family background mainly affects the quality of employment, independently of the education level reached.

Does our place on the social ladder when adolescents determine our employment opportunities when we are adults? Could this relationship have changed during the economic recession? The answers to these questions are fraught with subtleties, and in Europe they are difficult to study owing to a lack of comparable statistical information between countries that reflects the family situation of members of the adult population during their youth.

Exceptionally, in 2005 and 2011, the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EUSILC), the main source of information on the economic and social situation of European families, included additional questions in a module on the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Specifically, it included questions on the social situation of the parents and families of interviewees when the latter were aged around 14 years, which has enabled us to answer our question for five European countries: the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands. Individuals aged between 25 and 55 years were interviewed and we know what the educational level of the parents was, their occupation if they were employed, the demographic structure of the household at the time and also whether the family was experiencing a period of economic difficulties or was comfortably off.

Our study offers new evidence on the role of social background in employment opportunities, improving some key aspects. The first is that we evaluate social backgrounds in a broader way than is usual. We consider, as underlined by the work of Björklund and Jäntti (2012), and Erola et al. (2016), that the potential of parents to transmit social advantage to their offspring is related with a set of variables broader than occupation or educational level. For this reason, we construct a more comprehensive social background indicator that includes, in addition to the occupation and educational level of the parents, other characteristics of the household related with the number of dependent minors, the family structure and the family’s financial situation when the individual was an adolescent.  

Secondly, we investigate what role the economic cycle (expansions against recessions) plays in the transmission of social advantage. The objective is to discover whether what parents from better social backgrounds transmit to their children also enables them to tackle better the economic setbacks in a generalised crisis. If so, there should be no differences in the opportunities reached by individuals of different ages and the same social background. If, rather than the transmission of characteristics it is the protection by parents through their social relations or economic resources, we should observe differences in the role of social background among individuals of different ages, and the youngest would be the main beneficiaries of parental protection.

Finally, the study analyses various European countries where few empirical analyses have been carried out on the intergenerational transmission of opportunities.

An important number of economic and sociological studies have confirmed the transmission of social advantage through the generations in different societies (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Björklund and Jäntti, 2009, Ermisch et al. 2012). The results of a host of studies undertaken in English-speaking and Scandinavian countries indicate that enjoying a good family background increases the possibilities of achieving a good educational level and also of achieving a better employment situation, regardless of the level of education or training reached.

For this study, we selected five countries of the European Union (EU) as representatives of the different Welfare State models that prevail in the continent (Anglo-Saxon, Mediterranean, Continental and Eastern Europe). Also taking into account certain restrictions related with the availability and quality of data in the survey that did not allow the effective comparison of all countries in the EU, we analysed two countries from Southern Europe (Italy and Spain), one from Eastern Europe (Poland), one Anglo-Saxon (the United Kingdom) and another continental (the Netherlands).

We defined family background through a statistical method that allowed us to construct an individual indicator of family background that jointly considers various characteristics: educational level of the parents (father or mother, whoever has the highest one), occupation, number of dependent minors, single-parent families and family financial situation during adolescence. We calculated the distance to the average indicator by five-year generational groups and we divided the population from each country into five groups according to their family background and whether they are close to or distant from the average. Thus, the first group includes those with a family background furthest below the average and the fifth group those family backgrounds furthest above the average.

The total effect of social background on employment opportunities works through the obtaining of better educational levels (indirect effect) as well as through direct impact (linked to the transmission of cognitive, thinking and intellectual skills as well as non-cognitive, social and cultural skills and attitude) which promotes the transmission of social benefit from parents to children and the capacity of parents to protect or give advantages to their children through their social relations and economic resources.

If we estimate each individual’s probability of being employed according to their current socioeconomic characteristics (including educational level attained and social background), we obtain the results that we represent in graphs 1 and 2. During the period analysed, the possibilities for employment of men and women declined considerably, both in Spain and in Italy, due to the economic recession (the blue line is always above the red line) and, in contrast, these opportunities increased in Poland, which experienced a cycle of strong growth. Thus, for example, in the case of Spain the probability of a man being employed if he had a low family background fell from 90 to 78%; in Italy, it dropped somewhat less: from 93 to 89%; whereas in Poland the probability of being employed for an individual of any group grew by around 5% (from 79 to 84% for the first group). As we can appreciate, the red and blue curves are practically parallel in most countries, which indicates that differences in employment probabilities are very similar for all the groups. 

If, as social background improves (as we move from group 1 to group 5), the probability of employment increases, we have a rising straight line. This indicates that the better the social background, the greater the probability of being employed. If, in contrast, the probability of employment does not increase as background improves, the line will be flat, which will indicate that the direct effect of social background is negligible.

A clearly seen in graphs 1 and 2, where we do not include the indirect effect of social background on employment through education, the probabilities of finding employment are not very different by social background.

We observe that there are two important exceptions to the previous general result: the first is the case of Spanish men with a lower-level family background who appear to be more jeopardised by the recession than those with a better social background (the distance between the blue curve and the red curve for group 1 is greater than that of any other group, graph 1). The probability of being employed among men with a worse family background fell from 90% to 78%; while for those with a better family background, it only fell from 90% to 82% (group 4) and from 89% to 80% (group 5).

The second exception are Polish women who come from families with a low social status, who barely managed to improve their employment opportunities during a period of strong growth in their country, unlike women with a better family background (the blue and red curves overlap each other in graphs 1 and 2; the red curve is above the blue in groups with a better social background, graph 2). Specifically, women with a worse social background did not experience changes in their employment probability, whereas those with a better social background increased their probability of being employed from 76 to 79%.

Not only is it important to identify what role is played by social background in the possibility of accessing employment, but also to assess whether the employment accessed by individuals with different social backgrounds varies in quality. To evaluate quality of employment we have used two key variables: salary level and contract stability (temporary versus permanent). The results indicate that, in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom alike, and in contrast with the situation in Poland and the Netherlands, the quality of jobs accessed by individuals with a lower social background is poorer than that of jobs accessed by individuals with a higher social background. In other words, in general terms, social background does not influence the probability of having a job, but does influence the quality of it.

To confirm the above, firstly we estimated the average wage per hour by groups of family background and educational level, taking into account other key socioeconomic characteristics such as age, region, etc.

In graphs 3 and 4 we represent the results separately for men and women. Again, the slope of the curves obtained indicates the relationship between quality of employment in terms of salary and family background: the steeper the slope of each curve, the greater the salary advantage of individuals with a better family background. 

We observe in all countries that individuals with a lower social background achieve jobs with a significantly lower wage/hour than those with a better social background. In any case, the increase in average salary as family background improves is significantly greater in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom than in the Netherlands or Poland. The Netherlands constitute an exception to this tendency, above all in terms of men’s salaries; with regard to women’s salaries, social background has some effect, which could be related with the segregation between male and female part-time work that exists in the country.

The effect of social background on salary is manifest even when we take educational level into account. The hourly wage of individuals with the same educational level differs according to their family background, especially at medium and high educational levels. Therefore, even when the educational level remains the same, we observe important differences in the average salary among individuals with a different social background.

As reflected by graphs 3 and 4, all these differences are somewhat more pronounced in Italy and Spain. With the same educational level, men and women born in households with a high social background (group 5) have higher salaries. In Poland, in contrast, the effect of social background is manifested mainly in education and is not directly relevant for either men or women. In this country, the curve for men and women with a higher educational level is significantly above the curves for medium and low educational levels, but its slope is almost flat. Salary differences between individuals of high and low social background (extreme groups) in Spain, Italy and Poland move between 15 and 30%, depending on the country and the year analysed. The impact of the economic cycle is negligible.

The second element of employment quality that we consider is contract stability (permanent against temporary). For this, we estimate the probability that an individual has a temporary contract versus a permanent one taking into account their socioeconomic characteristics. In graphs 5 and 6 we represent the estimated probability of having a temporary contract in the two years analysed, separately for men and women. Again, the slope of the curves indicates the relationship between quality of employment and family background. The greater the slope of each curve, the greater the difference in the probability of having a temporary job among individuals of different social backgrounds. 

In Spain, Italy and Poland, the probability of being in temporary employment is higher among men and women of lower social background than among those of medium or high social background, therefore family background is also a relevant variable for avoiding the most unstable and insecure jobs in these three countries. 

It is the steepness of the curves that informs us about the relationship between probability of temporary work and social background. Although the curve for Italy has little negative slope, it is significant statistically. While it is true that the curve for the United Kingdom is similar to a certain extent, it is not significant, probably because there are far fewer individuals with a temporary contract. 

Our results show that in Spain having a higher social background is particularly relevant for avoiding the most insecure, worst-paid jobs and with the worst associated benefits. Spanish workers with a low social background have a significantly higher probability (10 percentage points higher) of finding themselves in temporary jobs than those of medium and high social background. This effect is clearly observed in the case of men and women alike. In Poland, social background is also relevant for determining the possibility of having an unstable job, although its impact is somewhat lower than the impact it has in Spain. 

Likewise in the case of salaries, we confirm that, in general, the economic cycle is not relevant in any of the countries. A small change is only detected among Spanish men of low social background who, from the start of the recession, have fewer possibilities of being in temporary employment than before the crisis. This result seems to be linked to the significant destruction of temporary work that took place in Spain between 2008 and 2011.

Finally, it is important to highlight that in none of the countries analysed do we find differences by age in terms of the impact of social background on the probabilities of finding employment or on employment quality.

Our results indicate that family background affects the probability of employment in some countries and the quality of jobs in all of them, although not with the same intensity. These effects are produced independently of the educational level of individuals.

In Spain and Italy, differences in quality of employment due to social background are greater than in other countries. In other words, if we have two people with the same education level, but who are descendants of families with different positions on the social scale, in both countries the person belonging to the family better positioned socially will have more possibilities of finding a good job. In Spain, our results indicate that a high social background is particularly relevant for avoiding more insecure and worse paid jobs.

Finally, the impact of family background on employment opportunities does not seem to have changed during the recession, nor does it appear to be different for individuals of different ages.

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